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Abstract
We exploit plausibly exogenous geographical variation in the reduction in domestic demand 
caused by the Great Recession in Spain to document the existence of a robust, within-fi rm 
negative causal relationship between demand-driven changes in domestic sales and export 
fl ows. Spanish manufacturing fi rms whose domestic sales were reduced by more during 
the crisis observed a larger increase in their export fl ows, even after controlling for fi rms’ 
supply determinants (such as labor costs). This negative relationship between demand-
driven changes in domestic sales and changes in export fl ows illustrates the capacity of 
export markets to counteract the negative impact of local demand shocks. We rationalize 
our fi ndings through a standard heterogeneous-fi rm model of exporting expanded to allow 
for non-constant marginal costs of production. Using a structurally estimated version of this 
model, we conclude that the fi rm-level responses to the slump in domestic demand in Spain 
could well have accounted for around one-half of the spectacular increase in Spanish goods 
exports (the so-called “Spanish export miracle”) over the period 2009-13.
Keywords: vent-for-surplus, exports, domestic slump, increasing marginal cost.
JEL classifi cation: F12, F14, F62.
Resumen
En este artículo utilizamos variación geográfi ca plausiblemente exógena en la reducción de la 
demanda interna causada por la Gran Recesión en España para documentar la existencia de 
una robusta relación causal negativa a nivel de empresa entre cambios provocados por la 
demanda en las ventas internas y en los fl ujos de exportaciones. Las empresas manufactureras 
españolas cuyas ventas internas se redujeron en mayor medida durante la crisis experimentaron 
un mayor incremento en sus fl ujos de exportación, incluso una vez que se controla por 
sus determinantes de oferta, tales como sus costes laborales. Esta relación negativa entre 
cambios en las ventas internas y cambios en los fl ujos de exportación provocados por cambios 
de la demanda ilustra la capacidad de los mercados de exportación para compensar el 
impacto negativo de shocks de demanda locales. Los resultados presentados en el artículo 
se racionalizan a través de un modelo estándar de exportaciones con heterogeneidad de 
empresas que permite la existencia de costes marginales de producción no constantes. 
Utilizando una versión de este modelo estimada de manera estructural, concluimos que las 
respuestas a nivel de empresa a la caída de la demanda interna en España podrían explicar 
alrededor de la mitad del espectacular incremento de las exportaciones de bienes en España 
(el denominado «milagro exportador español») en el período 2009-2013. 
Palabras clave: salida al exterior, exportaciones, crisis interna, coste marginal creciente.
Códigos JEL: F12, F14, F62.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s shook the core of many advanced economies.
Few countries experienced the consequences of the global downturn as intensively as the Southern
economies of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Spain is a case in point. From its peak in
2008, Spain’s real GDP fell by an accumulated 8.9% in the following five years, until bottoming
out in 2013. During the same period, private final consumption contracted by 14.0%, and the
unemployment rate shot up from 9.6% to 26.9%. Portugal and Greece experienced comparably
marked domestic contractions between 2008 and 2013, with their GDPs shrinking by 7.9% and
26.3%, respectively.
Despite these severe domestic slumps, merchandise exports in these economies demonstrated a
remarkable resilience and partly contributed to mitigating the effects of the Great Recession. In the
Spanish case, after tumbling by 11.5% in real terms during the global trade collapse of 2008-2009,
Spanish merchandise exports quickly recovered and grew by 30.7% in real terms between 2009 and
2013.1 Overall, real Spanish merchandise exports grew by an accumulated 15.6% during the 2008-
2013 period, while real merchandise exports in the rest of the euro area increased by only 6.8%
during the same years. As a result, and as shown in Figure 1, the share of euro area merchandise
exports to non-euro area countries accounted for by Spain increased markedly during this period,
despite the contemporaneous decline in the relative weight of Spain’s GDP in the euro area’s GDP.
Very similar patterns are observed for the cases of Portugal and Greece (see Appendix C.1).2
Figure 1: The Spanish Export Miracle
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1The implied 6.9% annual growth in real exports from 2009 to 2013 almost doubled the 3.8% annual growth in
real exports during the period 2000-2008.
2In Appendix C.1, we replicate Figure 1 for Portugal and Greece, and also for Germany, whose relative GDP
increased during the crisis. In all three cases, we observe a negative relationship between these countries’ GDP shares
in the euro area and their shares in euro area goods exports to other countries. See Section 3 and Appendix B for a
description of the data sources underlying these figures.
At first glance, this remarkable export performance appears to be consistent with the type of
“internal devaluation” processes advocated by international organizations (such as IMF, ECB or
the European Commission) since the onset of the crisis. According to this thesis, wage moderation
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coupled with a set of structural reforms (most notably labor market reforms) led to a fall in
relative unit labor costs, allowing Southern European firms to reduce their relative export prices
and increase their market shares abroad. Nevertheless, the adjustment in labor costs achieved via
these policies was modest up to 2013 and this channel had a limited contribution to export growth
over the period 2010-13 (see, for instance, IMF, 2015, 2018; Salas, 2018).
What explains then the remarkable export growth in Spain, Portugal and Greece over the
period 2010-2013? At least for the case of Spain, an often-invoked alternative explanation relates
the growth in exports directly to the collapse in domestic demand. According to this hypothesis,
the unexpected demand-driven reduction in Spanish firms’ domestic sales, in combination with the
irreversibility of certain investments in inputs, freed up capacity that these firms used to serve
customers abroad.3 More precisely, this explanation posits that, as domestic demand dropped,
Spanish firms were able to cut their short-run marginal costs by reducing their usage of flexible
inputs (e.g., temporary workers and materials) relative to their usage of fixed inputs (e.g., physical
capital and permanent workers). This fall in short-run marginal costs translated into a gain in
competitiveness in foreign markets and, consequently, to an increase in firms’ exports.4
This alternative explanation resonates with the “vent-for-surplus” theory of the benefits of in-
ternational trade, which has a long tradition in economics dating back to Adam Smith.5 Despite its
intuitive nature and distinguished lineage, the link between a domestic slump and export growth
is hard to reconcile with modern workhorse models of international trade. The reason for this is
that these canonical models – including those emphasizing product differentiation and economies
of scale of the Krugman-Melitz type – assume that firms face constant marginal costs of produc-
tion, an assumption that implies that firms’ domestic and export sales decisions can be studied
independently from each other.
In this paper, we leverage Spanish firm-level data from 2002 to 2013, and geographic variation
across Spanish regions in the reduction in domestic demand caused by the financial crisis, to study
3See “La exportacio´n como escape” in El Pa´ıs, 1/16/2016, for a journalistic account in Spanish with some
specific case studies (https://elpais.com/economia/2016/01/14/actualidad/1452794395_894216.html). Further
firm-level examples are provided in the more recent “El milagro exportador espan˜ol” in El Pa´ıs, 5/27/2018
(http://elpais.com/economia/2018/05/25/actualidad/1527242520_600876.html), a newspaper article which was
inspired by an early version of our paper.
4Generally, one can interpret this explanation as encompassing any mechanism that makes firms’ short-run
marginal cost curves increasing and that, thus, links the drop in firms’ domestic demand to a downward move-
ment along their supply curves. This effect is distinct from that of an “internal devaluation”, which is associated
with a downward shift in firms’ marginal cost or supply curves (e.g., reductions in the price of factors or materials,
or increases in productivity).
5In The Wealth of Nations (1776) Book II, Chapter V, Adam Smith writes “When the produce of any particular
branch of industry exceeds what the demand of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and exchanged
for something for which there is a demand at home. Without such exportation, a part of the productive labour of
the country must cease, and the value of its annual produce diminish.” The term “vent-for-surplus” was introduced
by John Stuart Mill in his Principles of Political Economy (1848) and popularized by Williams (1929) and Myint
(1958).
the empirical relevance of the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism. To do so, we divide our sample into
a “boom” period (2002-08) and a “bust” period (2009-13), and measure the extent to which, at
the firm level, a decline in the domestic sales in the bust period relative to the boom period is
associated with an increase in export sales over the two periods. When measuring this association,
we control for “boom-to-bust” changes in observed marginal cost shifters (i.e., measures of factor
prices and productivity) to account for potential internal devaluation effects. To further isolate
demand-driven changes in domestic sales, we exploit the fact that the financial crisis and the Great
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Recession affected different geographical areas in Spain differentially. More specifically, we rely on
municipality-level registration data on a major household durable consumption item, vehicles, and
use the change in the municipality-level stock of vehicles per capita between 2002-08 and 2009-13
as a proxy for the extent to which the Great Recession affected demand across municipalities. We
use this measure of changes in local demand as an instrument for the reduction in the domestic
sales of firms located in different parts of Spain.
To understand the properties of our estimates of the causal impact of demand-driven changes
in domestic sales on exports, we first base our analysis on a commonly used model of firms’ export
behavior: a model a` la Melitz (2003). For our purposes, this framework serves the role of identifying
several empirical challenges that one encounters when measuring the relevance of the “vent-for-
surplus” mechanism; i.e., when measuring the causal impact of changes in a firm’s domestic sales
on exports working exclusively through changes in the firm’s domestic demand.6 We draw three
main conclusions from our theoretical analysis. First, as long as firms’ marginal cost shifters (i.e.,
firms’ productivity and production factor costs) are not perfectly observable – and their unobserved
component is not fully captured by various fixed effects – there will tend to be a positive spurious
correlation between domestic sales and exports that does not reflect a causal impact of the former
on the latter. Second, the fact that firm-level domestic sales are computed as the difference between
firm-level total sales and exports leads to a non-classical error-in-variables bias that, under plausible
conditions, tends to generate a negative spurious correlation between exports and domestic sales
(see also Berman et al., 2015). Third, an instrumental variable approach that exploits a proxy
for ‘local demand’ as an instrument for the changes in domestic sales of the firms producing in a
given locality identifies the causal impact of demand-driven changes in domestic sales on exports
as long as it satisfies three conditions: (i) it is indeed a useful proxy for ‘local demand’ (i.e., the
overall propensity to consume of the residents of a locality), (ii) ‘local demand’ is a good predictor
of the domestic sales of Spanish firms producing in a given locality, and (iii) this proxy is not
correlated with unobserved covariates that have an independent effect on Spanish firms’ exporting
decisions (i.e., unobserved marginal cost or export-demand shifters). We discuss each of these three
conditions in turn.
Although, given available data, we cannot directly test that “boom-to-bust” changes in the
6The Melitz (2003) model assumes that firms face constant marginal costs of production, implying the null
hypothesis of a zero effect of demand-driven changes in domestic sales on exports. However, as we show below,
the lessons we learn from this model in terms of the econometric challenges one faces when evaluating the “vent-for-
surplus” mechanism are also applicable to more general models that feature increasing marginal costs of production.
stock of vehicles per capita in the municipality of location of a firm satisfies conditions (i) and
(ii), prior work has provided empirical evidence supporting the independent validity of each of
these two conditions. First, an extensive literature in empirical macroeconomics has documented
that consumption of durable goods (such as vehicles) is strongly procyclical (see, for instance, the
survey by Stock and Watson, 1999). Second, a significant impact of highly localized demand shocks
on Spain-wide firm sales would be consistent with the findings of Hillberry and Hummels (2008),
who document that U.S. manufacturers’ shipments are extremely localized, with shipments within
their 5-digit zip code of location being three times as large as shipments outside their zip code.
Dı´az-Lanchas et al. (2013) find evidence of an even stronger “own-zip-code” home bias using a
micro-database of road freight shipments within Spain. Consistent with this prior literature, our
first-stage results indicate that our instrument is indeed relevant, in the sense that the change
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in the municipality-level stock of vehicles per capita between 2002-08 and 2009-13 has significant
predictive power for the domestic (i.e., Spain-wide) sales of firms producing in that municipality.
Armed with these first-stage results, we show that a larger demand-driven drop in domestic
sales in the bust period relative to the boom period is associated with a significantly larger growth
in export sales from boom to bust (conditional on exporting in both periods). Furthermore, these
IV estimates are significantly larger in absolute value than the OLS ones. This is consistent with
the biases predicted by our baseline Melitz (2003)-type model in the plausible scenario in which
our specification only imperfectly controls for a firm’s supply and export demand determinants.
Specifically, our IV estimates point at an intensive-margin elasticity of exports to domestic sales in
the neighborhood of −1.6, while the OLS one is around −0.2.7
As indicated by condition (iii) above, a potential challenge to our identification approach is
that the “boom-to-bust” changes in the stock of vehicles per capita in the municipality of location
of a firm may be correlated with the extent to which unobserved shifters of the firm’s marginal
cost curve changed in the bust period relative to the boom period. Although, by definition, we
cannot test this identification assumption, we provide several additional pieces of evidence that
are consistent with the empirical relevance of the “vent-for-surplus” hypothesis and that address
some specific sources of endogeneity that could affect the validity of the instrument in our baseline
specification.
First, an identification threat arises if differences in the severity of the contraction in vehicle
purchases across Spanish municipalities are not exclusively a reflection of differences in demand
shocks, but also partly a reflection of unobserved production costs affecting car manufacturers.
According to this hypothesis, if a significant share of vehicles is sold in the near vicinity of where
they are produced, municipalities that concentrate a significant share of firms operating in the auto
industry could observe a correlation in the boom to bust changes in production costs and purchases
of new vehicles. Our results are robust to this identification threat. Both the relevance of our
instrument as well as the finding of a sizable negative elasticity between domestic sales and exports
7When estimating the effect of a demand-driven drop in domestic sales on the probability of exporting, we find
an estimate that is not statistically different from zero.
are robust to excluding from the estimating sample: (a) all firms in the auto industry, no matter
where they are located; (b) all firms located in any zip code that hosts at least one auto-maker
employing more than 20 workers; (c) all firms located in any zip code that is geographically close
to a zip code in which a significant share of manufacturing employment is in the auto industry;
and (d) all firms producing in sectors that are either leading input providers or leading buyers of
the vehicles manufacturing industry.
Second, the “vent-for-surplus” hypothesis suggests that the elasticity of a firm’s Spain-wide sales
with respect to changes in local demand is likely to vary across firms in ways that can be verified.
For instance, firms will naturally differ in their exposure to demand changes in their municipality
of location depending on the share of their total domestic sales that is earned in that municipality.
While we do not observe firms’ sales distribution across different Spanish municipalities, it seems
plausible that small firms will be more likely to concentrate their sales in their municipality of
location than large firms. We indeed find that the first-stage elasticity of domestic sales with
respect to our demand proxy is larger for smaller firms. We also find that a reduction in the
municipality-level stock of vehicles per capita is associated with a larger reduction in Spain-wide
sales for firms belonging to less “tradable” sectors, as measured by the sectoral share of within-
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province shipments in total shipments (computed from the C-Intereg database on road freight
shipments within Spain).
Third, because different geographic areas in Spain were affected by the Great Recession in
very heterogeneous degrees, it is conceivable that for many firms the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism
would have operated largely at the intranational level. Rather than being pushed towards export
markets, certain firms located in areas with disproportionate decreases in local demand could have
redirected their sales largely towards other regions within Spain in which local demand decreased
less (or increased). This implies that we should observe a larger elasticity of firms’ Spain-wide
sales with respect to proxies that capture changes in demand at the province level (rather than
at the municipality level), as they preclude firms from redirecting their sales across municipalities
belonging to the same province.8 Conversely, if one were to hypothesize that our measure of
changes in the stock of vehicles per capita is purely operating as a proxy for changes in unobserved
marginal cost shifters (e.g., unobserved factor prices), then any dispersion in these unobserved
shifters across municipalities located in the same province would imply that a firm’s domestic sales
elasticity with respect to our province-level instrument should be smaller than that with respect
to our municipality-level instrument, as the province-level instrument would naturally be a worse
proxy for the unobserved marginal costs shifters relevant to the firm. Our results in fact feature
more than twice as large a response of domestic sales to a change in the instrument when the latter
is measured at the province level than when it is measured at the municipality level.9
8While there are over 8,000 municipalities in Spain, there are only 50 provinces. Provinces are therefore significantly
larger than municipalities.
9Consistently with changes in the stock of vehicles per capita capturing demand changes, we also find that a firm’s
domestic sales react to a distance- and population-weighted average of the changes in the stock of vehicles in all
municipalities other than the municipality in which the firm is located, even after controlling for the changes in the
stock of vehicles in the firm’s municipality.
Fourth, consistently with the hypothesis that firms face increasing marginal costs of production
and that the slope of these costs is inversely related to the elasticity of output with respect to
inputs whose investment is not pre-determined or irreversible, we document that the estimated
causal effect of demand-driven changes in domestic sales on exports is smaller for firms in labor-
intensive and material-intensive sectors, suggesting the importance of fixed factors and capacity
utilization in explaining this causal linkage.
Fifth, while our baseline instrumentation approach exploits a proxy for demand changes and
is thus agnostic about the underlying causes of the differential impact of the Great Recession in
Spain, we also explore alternative instrumentation strategies that focus instead on the deep roots
of the differential fall in demand across Spanish regions. More specifically, we show that, relative to
the boom years, firm-level domestic sales fell by more in municipalities with lower housing supply
elasticities (in which house prices grew disproportionately during the boom years), in zip codes with
a larger pre-crisis contribution of the construction sector to total labor income, and in provinces
that experienced larger declines in tourism during the bust years.10 Reassuringly, the second-stage
elasticities of exports to domestic sales associated with these instruments are similar in magnitude
to those obtained with our benchmark instrument.
Sixth, although we control for firm-specific average wages in all of our specifications, compo-
sitional changes in the firm’s workforce may have caused changes in effective labor costs that our
10The construction and tourist sectors are among the ones that experienced the largest reduction in total sales and
employment in the bust relative to the boom. Regions more exposed to these sectors are likely to have experienced
a larger drop in demand for manufactured goods.
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wage measure does not correctly capture. An important feature of the Spanish labor market is
the division of the workforce into permanent and temporary workers, the latter group being typi-
cally less productive than the former. We do indeed observe that firms whose share of temporary
workers dropped by more in the bust relative to the boom experienced a smaller drop in their
exports, consistently with the hypothesis that an increase in the ratio of permanent to temporary
workers had an effect equivalent to a positive supply shock. The elasticity of exports with respect
to domestic sales remains however largely unaffected when we control for the firm’s change in the
share of temporary workers. Similarly, controlling for the change in financial costs experienced by
the firms does not change the second-stage estimate of the elasticity of exports with respect to
domestic sales.
Seventh, and finally, we address the possibility that the correlation between boom to bust
changes in the firm’s domestic sales and in the stock of vehicles per capita is spurious and due
to the presence of cross-municipality correlation in these variables’ time trends. To rule out this
possible explanation for our results, we perform a placebo exercise in which we break each of the
boom and the bust periods into two subperiods, and evaluate whether our instrument (changes in
demand between the boom and bust periods) predicts changes in domestic sales between the two
boom subperiods (i.e., between 2006-08 and 2002-05) and between the two bust subperiods (i.e.,
between 2012-13 and 2009-11). In both cases, we find that it does not.
Having established a causal link between changes in domestic demand and exports that operates
through firms’ changes in domestic sales, we generalize our baseline model a` la Melitz (2003) to
allow for non-constant marginal costs of production. We rationalize this cost structure by including
a pre-determined and fixed factor into the firm’s production function, and show that the curvature
of the marginal cost function is related to the elasticity of output with respect to all flexible factors.
Furthermore, we demonstrate how to estimate the curvature of the marginal cost function using a
simple variant of our IV estimator, and employ the resulting estimates to quantitatively evaluate
the importance of the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism in explaining the 2009-13 observed export
miracle in Spain. More specifically, we implement a variance-decomposition exercise to determine
the extent to which the domestic slump in Spain was driven by demand versus supply shocks. We
then use our model to predict the “boom-to-bust” growth in Spanish exports that we would have
observed if there had been no change in demand between the boom and bust periods. We find that,
in this case, the growth in Spanish exports would have been 54.7% smaller than what we observe
in the data and, thus, we conclude that slightly more than half of the Spanish export miracle of
the period 2009-2013 can be attributed to the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism.
Our paper connects with several branches of the literature. As mentioned above, we relate
the Spanish export miracle to Adam Smith’s “vent-for-surplus” theory. The international trade
literature has largely ignored this hypothesis as exemplified by the fact that we have only found
one mention (in Fisher and Kakkar, 2004) of the term “vent-for-surplus” in all issues of the Journal
of International Economics.11 Nevertheless, there has been an active recent international trade
literature focused on relaxing the assumption of constant marginal costs in the canonical (Melitz)
model of firm-level trade, and has shown that, in the presence of increasing marginal costs, there
is a natural substitutability between domestic sales and exports for which there is supporting
11A broader search to include top general-interest journals identified Neary and Schweinberger (1986), who provide
a neoclassical rationale for the “vent-for-surplus” idea.
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empirical evidence. This literature includes the work of Vannoorenberghe (2012), Blum et al.
(2013), Soderbery (2014), and Ahn and McQuoid (2017). The results in those papers very much
resonate with the OLS results using yearly data that we describe in Online Appendix G. Relative
to this prior literature, our paper provides a more explicit discussion of the endogeneity concerns
associated with simple OLS reduced-form regressions. More importantly, our paper also attempts to
identify and structurally interpret the causal effect of a domestic slump on exporting by exploiting
plausibly exogenous variation in domestic sales during a particularly salient episode. Relatedly,
in contemporaneous work, Fan et al. (2018) exploit variation in the extent to which Chinese
authorities enforce the collection of value-added taxes to establish a negative causal link between
the profitability of domestic sales and firm-level exports. Conversely, using French data over the
period 1995-2001, Berman et al. (2015) document a positive (reverse) causal effect of changes in
firm-level exports on firm-level domestic sales. Their identification strategy (based on exogenous
variation in foreign demand conditions) is quite distinct from ours and so is their setting, since
1995-2001 was a tranquil period of sustained economic growth in France. For these reasons, even
if one takes their findings at face value, it would be unreasonable to interpret them as questioning
the empirical relevance of the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism.12
Our identification strategy is inspired by the influential work of Mian and Sufi (and collabo-
rators) on the causes and consequences of the Great Recession in the United States. Specifically,
Mian and Sufi (2009) identify important differences in the extent to which the mortgage default
crisis affected household wealth in different areas of the United States. In subsequent work, Mian,
Rao and Sufi (2013) and Mian and Sufi (2014) study how the unequal geographic distribution of
household wealth losses resulting from the housing crisis gave rise to a geographically unequal de-
cline in consumption across U.S. counties. Our finding that geographical variation in the change
in the stock of vehicles per capita is a significant predictor of variation in the change in local man-
ufacturing sales in Spain is very much consistent with the findings in Mian and Sufi (2013), who
also explore the link between household housing wealth and auto sales. Illustrating this link in
the Spanish case would be interesting, but this is complicated by the sluggish adjustment of house
prices in Spain during the financial crisis, as documented among others by Akin et al. (2014).13
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we lay out a baseline model of firm
behavior in the spirit of Melitz (2003) and discuss its implications for the estimation of the causal
impact of demand-driven changes in domestic sales on exports. In Section 3, we introduce our
firm-level data and, in Section 4, we develop our core instrumental variable estimation approach.
The results of this instrumental variable approach are presented in Section 5. We present additional
evidence in favor of the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism in Section 6. In Section 7, we generalize the
baseline model a` la Melitz (2003) to allow for non-constant marginal costs, and use this framework
to quantify the importance of the “vent-for-surplus” channel in linking the slump in domestic sales
to the growth in Spanish exports. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 8.
12Our paper also relates to previous work documenting the behavior of firm-level exports in Spain around the Great
Recession, including Antra`s (2011), Myro (2015), Eppinger et al. (2017), and De Lucio et al. (2017a, 2017b). This
literature is largely descriptive and has not attempted to test the relative contribution of different mechanisms in
explaining the patterns observed in the data.
13More specifically, the fact that the housing market adjustment following the bursting of the housing bubble in
Spain was largely made through quantities rather than prices implies that standard measures of housing wealth in
Spain are not as good predictors for household consumption as they are in other countries.
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2 Benchmark Model: Estimation Guidelines
As indicated in the Introduction, we aim to estimate the causal impact of within-firm demand-
driven changes in domestic sales on firm-level exports. To guide our empirical analysis and our
choice of an adequate estimator, we first consider the implications for this question of a model
of exporting with heterogeneous firms along the lines of Melitz (2003), which is the canonical
model of firm-level exports in the recent international trade literature. This model features the
standard assumption of constant marginal costs. After presenting our evidence contradictory with
this assumption, in Section 7 we will develop an extension of this benchmark model that allows for
non-constant marginal costs. Crucially, the lessons we learn in this section about the properties of
different estimators will also apply in the more general model.
2.1 Benchmark Model: Estimating Equation
We index manufacturing firms producing in Spain by i, firms’ production locations within Spain
by , the sectors to which firms belong by s, and the two potential markets in which they may sell
by j = {d, x}, with d denoting the domestic market and x denoting the export market. At a given
point in time, firm i faces the following isoelastic demand in market j,
Qij =
P−σij
P 1−σsj
Esjξ
σ−1
ij , σ > 1, (1)
where Qij denotes the number of units of output of firm i demanded in market j if it sets a price
Pij , Psj is the sectoral price index in j, Esj is the total sectoral expenditure in market j expressed
in units of the numeraire; and ξij is a firm-market specific demand shifter.
Firm i’s total variable cost of producing Qij units of output for market j is given by
cijQij with cij ≡ τsj 1
ϕi
ωi, (2)
where cij denotes the marginal cost to firm i of selling one unit of output in market j, τsj denotes
an iceberg trade cost, ϕi is a measure of firm-specific productivity, and ωi is the firm-specific cost
of a bundle of inputs.14 Additionally, we assume that firm i needs to pay an exogenous fixed cost
Fij to sell a positive amount in market j.
Firm i chooses optimally the quantity offered in each market j, Qij , taking the price index,
Psj , and the size of the market, Esj , as given. As the marginal production cost is independent of
the firm’s total output and the per-market fixed costs are independent of the firm’s participation
in other markets, the optimization problem of the firm is separable across markets. Specifically,
conditional on selling to a market j, firm i solves the following optimization problem
max
Qij
{
Q
σ−1
σ
ij P
1−σ
σ
sj E
1
σ
sjξ
σ−1
σ
ij − τsj
1
ϕi
ωiQij
}
,
and sales by firm i to market j are thus: Rij = PijQij = κ ((ξijϕi)/(τsjωi))
σ−1EsjP σ−1sj , where κ is
a function of σ. For the case of exports (j = x), and taking logs, we can rewrite this expression as:
14Since our econometric specifications below include some location fixed effects, it would be straightforward to let
the iceberg trade cost τsj also be a function of the production location  .
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lnRix = lnκ+ (σ − 1) (ln ξix + lnϕi − lnωi)− (σ − 1) (ln τsx − lnPsx) + lnEsx. (3)
The bulk of our empirical analysis will compare firm-level export behavior in a bust period,
relative to a boom period.15 With that in mind, and letting Δ lnX denote the log change in the
cross-year average value of X from boom to bust, we can express the log change in exports from
15In Online Appendix G, we theoretically develop and empirically test specifications that use yearly data; these
results facilitate the comparison of our estimates with those in the previous literature.
boom to bust as
Δ lnRix = (σ − 1) [Δ ln ξix +Δ lnϕi −Δ lnωi]− (σ − 1) (Δ ln τsx −Δ lnPsx) + lnΔEsx. (4)
In order to transition to an estimating equation, we model the change in firm-specific foreign
demand, productivity and cost levels as follows:
Δ ln(ξix) = ξsx + ξx + u
ξ
ix,
Δ ln(ϕi) = ϕs + ϕ + δϕΔ ln(ϕ
∗
i ) + u
ϕ
i ,
Δ ln(ωi) = ωs + ω + δωΔ ln(ω
∗
i ) + u
ω
i . (5)
Note that we are decomposing these terms into (i) a sector fixed effect, (ii) a production location
fixed effect, (iii) an observable part of these terms for the case of productivity (ϕ∗i ) and for input
bundle costs (ω∗i ), and (iv) a residual term.
16 We can thus re-write equation (4) as:
Δ lnRix = γsx + γx + (σ − 1) δϕΔ ln(ϕ∗i )− (σ − 1) δωΔ ln(ω∗i ) + εix, (6)
where γsx ≡ (σ − 1) [ξsx + ϕs − ωs − ln τsx + lnPsx] + lnEsx, γx ≡ (σ − 1) [ξx + ϕ − ω], and
εix = (σ − 1) [uξix + uϕi − uωi ]. (7)
Following analogous steps as above, we derive an expression for the change in domestic sales:
Δ lnRid = γsd + γd + (σ − 1) δϕΔ ln(ϕ∗i )− (σ − 1) δωΔ ln(ω∗i ) + εid, (8)
where γsd ≡ (σ − 1) [ξsd + ϕs − ωs − ln τsd + lnPsd] + lnEsd, γd ≡ (σ − 1) [ξd + ϕ − ω], and
εid = (σ − 1) [uξid + uϕi − uωi ]. (9)
We use equations (6) through (9) to generate predictions for the asymptotic properties of
several estimators of the response of log exports to demand-driven changes in log domestic sales.
The assumption of constant marginal costs implies that, according to this baseline model, the
parameter of interest is zero: changes to ξid that are independent of changes in the other model
fundamentals (i.e. ξix, ϕi, and ωi) have no effect on lnRix. However, many estimators of the
impact of log domestic sales on log exports based on observational data will yield estimates that
16More precisely, we assume that Δ ln ξix + Δ lnϕi − Δ lnωi = ds + d + δϕΔ ln(ϕ∗i ) + δωΔ ln(ω∗i ) +
ui, with ui incorporating the unobserved components of export demand, productivity and factor costs, and
E[ui|{d}s, {d},Δ ln(ϕ∗i ),Δ ln(ω∗i )] = 0, where {d}s denotes a complete set of sector-specific dummy variables, and
{d} is a complete set of location-specific dummy variables.
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differ from zero, even in large samples. We discuss here the asymptotic properties of different OLS
and IV estimators.
Consider first using OLS to estimate the parameters of the following regression, which includes
the change in log domestic sales as an additional covariate in equation (6):
Δ lnRix = γsx + γx + (σ − 1) δϕΔ ln(ϕ∗i )− (σ − 1) δωΔ ln(ω∗i ) + βΔ lnRid + εix. (10)
From equations (7), (9), and (10), the probability limit of the OLS estimator of the coefficient on
domestic sales can be written as
plim(βˆOLS) =
cov(Δ lnRix,Δ lnRid)
var(Δ lnRid) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi , uξid + uϕi − uωi )
var(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi )
, (11)
where we denote by Δ lnX the residual of a regression of a variable Δ lnX on a set of sector fixed
effects {d}s, location fixed effects {d}, and the observable covariates Δ lnϕ∗i , and Δ lnω∗i .
We draw two main conclusions from equation (11). First, as long as changes in productivity
and production factor costs are not perfectly observable – and their unobserved component is not
fully captured by the sector and location fixed effects – there will be a spurious positive correlation
between changes in exports and changes in domestic sales. Intuitively, unobserved productivity or
factor cost changes will affect sales in the same direction in all markets in which a firm sells. In
large samples, this spurious positive correlation will lead βˆOLS to be biased upwards. Second, even
when one proxies for changes in productivity and factor costs perfectly (i.e., uϕi = u
ω
i = 0), in the
presence of a non-zero correlation in the change in residual demand faced by firms in domestic and
foreign markets (i.e. cov(uξix, u
ξ
id) = 0), the OLS estimator of β will also converge to a non-zero
value. Because this residual demand does not capture market-specific aggregate shocks (which
are controlled by the sectoral fixed effects), it seems plausible that uξix and u
ξ
id will be positively
correlated in the data, leading βˆOLS again to be biased upwards. Notice also that, if we had not
controlled for sectoral and location fixed effects, the probability limit of the OLS estimator of β
would likely be even larger.17
Consider next using an IV estimator of the parameters in equation (11). Specifically, consider
instrumenting Δ lnRid with an observed covariate Zid such that Zid is either a proxy for Δ ln ξid
or has a causal impact on this firm-specific domestic demand shifter. In this case, the probability
limit of the IV estimator of β is
plim(βˆIV ) =
cov(Δ lnRix,Zid)
cov(Δ lnRid) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi ,Zid)
cov(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi ,Zid)
, (13)
where, as above, we use Zid to denote the residual from projecting Zid on a set of sector and location
fixed effects, and on the observable covariates Δ lnϕ∗i , and Δ lnω
∗
i . The constant-marginal-cost
17To give an example, the probability limit of βˆOLS in the absence of production location fixed effects is:
plim(βˆOLS) =
cov(uξix + ξx + ϕ − ω + uϕi − uωi , uξidt + ξd + ϕ − ω + uϕi − uωi )
var(uξidt + ξd + ϕ − ω + uϕi − uωi )
, (12)
which is likely larger than the expression in equation (11) due to: the presence of ϕ − ω in both terms of the
covariance in the numerator of the expression in equation (12); and, the likely positive correlation between ξx and
ξd.
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model predicts that βˆIV converges in probability to its true value of zero as long as the instrument
Zid verifies two conditions: (a) it is correlated with the change in domestic sales of firm i after
controlling for (or partialing out) sector and location fixed effects as well as observable determinants
of the firm’s marginal cost; and (b) it is mean independent of the change in firm-specific unobserved
productivity, uϕi , factor costs, u
ω
i , and export demand u
ξ
ix. As illustrated by the second equality
in equation (13), an instrument can only (generically) verify conditions (a) and (b) if its effect on
domestic sales works exclusively through the change in domestic demand not accounted for by the
fixed effects and observable covariates included in the estimating equation, i.e., uξid.
Although our discussion above has centered around the role of unobserved supply and demand
factors in biasing estimates of β, Berman et al. (2015) emphasize that measurement error in both
domestic sales and exports constitutes an additional source of possible bias when estimating the
effect of exports on domestic sales (or vice versa). Because in many empirical settings – ours
included – domestic sales are computed by subtracting exports from the total sales of firms, it is
important to stress that measurement error in this setting does not just lead to attenuation bias
as in the classical error-in-variables model. More specifically, and as we detail in Appendix A.1
(see also Berman et al., 2015), under plausible conditions, measurement error in firm total sales
and exports will lead to a negative bias in the OLS estimate βˆOLS . As we show in the Appendix,
however, if an instrument satisfies the same conditions (a) and (b) outlined above, and is also
mean independent of the measurement error in exports, the IV estimator in equation (13) will still
converge to zero in the presence of measurement error in total sales and exports.
We have focused our discussion so far on the intensive margin of exports, namely the impact
of domestic demand shocks on the level of exports conditional on exporting. In Online Appendix
E, we show that an analysis of the extensive margin of exports modeled as a linear probability
model delivers very similar insights. More specifically, when estimating the effect of changes in
domestic sales on the probability of exporting, even if the true effect were to be zero, one is likely
to estimate a spurious positive elasticity whenever productivity and production factor costs are not
perfectly captured by sector and location fixed effects and observable controls, or whenever unob-
served residual demand shocks are positively correlated across markets. An instrument satisfying
conditions (a) and (b) above will continue to effectively remove these biases as long as it satisfies
the additional condition of being mean independent of the part of the change in the firm’s fixed
cost of exporting not captured by the various fixed effects and marginal cost proxies. Consequently,
if the instrument affects domestic sales exclusively through the demand shock uξid, it will continue
to be valid in those extensive margin specifications (see Online Appendix E for more details).
3 Setting and Data
To construct a plausibly exogenous measure of the changes in domestic demand faced by firms, we
exploit geographical variation in the severity of the impact of the Great Recession of the late 2000s
and early 2010s in Spain. In this section, we describe the setting and data, and we defer a more
detailed account of our identification strategy to Section 4.
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18Internal demand is defined as final consumption expenditure by households and non-profit institutions serving
households (NPISHs) plus investment plus acquisitions of public administrations minus imports.
19The share of total employment in the construction sector peaked at 13.5% in the summer of 2007 and then
collapsed, reaching 5.4% by early 2014, with a similar pattern for the contribution of this sector to Spain’s GDP
(12.4% in 2007 and 6.8% in 2014).
20See EU Buildings Database at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/eu-buildings-database.
Figure 2: The Great Recession in Spain
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3.1 The Great Recession in Spain: Description
The macroeconomic history of Spain during the period 2000-2013 is a tale of a boom followed by
a bust. As shown in Figure 2, between the year 2000 and the peak of the cycle in 2008, Spain’s
GDP and internal demand grew by approximately 20% in real terms.18 In the five subsequent years
until 2013, domestic demand decreased to the level of the year 2000, while real GDP fell by an
accumulated 8.9%. In that same period, the unemployment rate shot up from 9% to 26%.
The particularly severe impact of the Great Recession in Spain is largely explained by the fact
that the economic boom of the early 2000s was primarily fueled by a real estate bubble. The
construction sector accumulated an increasing share of GDP and employment.19 For instance, in
2006, 735,000 new houses were built in Spain, a number comparable to that in Germany, Italy and
the UK combined.20 This real estate boom was in turn fostered by the increased availability of
cheap credit to households, firms and real estate developers, which resulted from capital inflows
related to the adoption of the euro in 2002 and the global savings glut (Santos, 2014). The ratio of
mortgage credit to GDP went up from 40% in 2000 to 100% in 2008 (Basco and Lopez-Rodriguez,
2018). Importantly, the very high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios associated with mortgage credit were
partly used to finance private consumption, particularly vehicle purchases (Masier and Villanueva,
2011).
The unraveling of the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. in the summer of 2007 had an
immediate effect on the supply of credit in Spain. However, the effects were fully transmitted to the
real economy only about one year later, coinciding with the fall of Lehman Brothers in September
2008, and the sudden stop in capital inflows. The recession officially started in the fourth quarter
of 2008, and intensified during 2009 with a 3.6% annual drop in GDP. The growth in the stock
of vehicles in Spain, which had been stable at an average rate of 3.6% a year during the boom,
suddenly came to a halt in 2008. In fact, in 2013, the national stock of vehicles in Spain was lower
than in 2008 by around 52,000 units.
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Importantly for the identification strategy we describe in the next section, the real estate boom
and subsequent bust featured significant geographic variation, concentrating mainly in some parts
of the Mediterranean coast and in medium-sized and large cities. As we shall document in the
next section, this in turn translated into substantial geographic variation in the extent to which
the Great Recession affected domestic demand and the domestic sales of Spanish firms.
3.2 The Spanish Export Miracle
As Figure 2 illustrates, the evolution of Spain’s aggregate merchandise exports during the period
2008-2013 was significantly different from that of aggregate domestic demand. After a significant
11.5% drop in real terms during the global trade collapse of 2008-09, aggregate exports grew during
the period 2009-2013 at an even faster rate than during the boom years. Specifically, while exports
had grown by an accumulated 34% in the eight-year period 2000-2008, they grew by a very similar
31% in just the four years between 2009 and 2013. This acceleration in export growth occurred at
a time during which all indicators of domestic economic activity were showing a significant decline.
As a consequence, the fall in real GDP was significantly smaller than the fall in domestic demand,
and the ratio of exports of goods to GDP grew from 15.1% in 2009 to 23.33% in 2013.
One might wonder whether changes in international relative prices could explain the growth
in Spanish exports during the period 2009-2013. It is however easy to rule out exchange rate
movements as a key operating mechanism since, as shown in Figure 1, Spanish exports clearly
outperformed those of other countries in the euro area (even though Spain’s GDP dropped faster
than the euro area average). It has also been argued that Spain underwent an internal devaluation
(through wage moderation starting in 2009, and via a labor market reform in 2012), but there is
little evidence that export prices in Spanish manufacturing fell relative to export prices in other
euro area countries in the period 2009-2013.21
Motivated by these facts, we will hereafter focus on an exploration of the “vent-for-surplus”
mechanism, according to which the domestic slump, by freeing up production capacity, might have
directly incentivized Spanish producers to sell their goods in foreign markets. In principle, the
associated growth in exports could have materialized along the intensive margin (with continuing
exporters increasing their exports) or along the extensive margin (via net entry into foreign mar-
kets). Later in the paper, we will explore both margins, but descriptive evidence suggests that the
21More specifically, Eurostat data on unit values indicate a very small decline of 0.2% between 2008 and 2013 in
Spanish export prices relative to those in the Euro area. Conversely, Eurostat data on industrial producer prices for
non-domestic markets reveal an increase of 2.5% in Spanish relative export prices.
bulk of the growth was driven by the intensive margin. Using detailed Spanish Customs data, De
Lucio et al. (2017a) find that net firm entry (i.e., new exporters net of firms quitting exporting)
contributed a mere 14% to the export growth between 2008 and 2013, while the remaining 86%
was driven by continuing exporters. Similarly, in our sample of manufacturing firms, we find that
continuers contributed 91% of the growth in exports between the boom and the bust periods, and
the extensive margin only accounted for 9% of export growth.22
22De Lucio et al. (2017a) also show that a third of the contribution of continuing exporters is due to entry into
new destination countries and products, while the other two thirds are due to growth in existing product-country
combinations. Unfortunately, the nature of the export data available to us does not allow us to explore the firm-level
extensive margin at the product or destination country level. See Section 3.3 for a description of our data limitations.
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23We obtain information on the Commercial Registry from two different sources: (i) the Central de Balances
dataset, compiled by the Bank of Spain, and (ii) the Sabi dataset, compiled by Informa (a private company). For
details on how we combine these two datasets, see Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez and Moral-Benito (2018).
24NACE (Nomenclature ge´ne´rale des activite´s e´conomiques dans les Communaute´s Europe´ennes) is the European
statistical classification of economic activities. It classifies manufacturing firms into 24 different sectors. Some firms
move to a different zip code or change their sector classification during the period of analysis. We assign to these
firms a fixed zip code and sector using their most frequent value in each case. A firm’s zip code corresponds to the
location of its headquarters.
3.3 Data Sources
Our data cover the period 2000-2013 and come from two separate confidential administrative data
sources. The first is the Commercial Registry (Registro Mercantil Central). It contains the annual
financial statements of around 85% of registered firms in the non-financial market economy in
Spain.23 Among other variables, it includes information on the following: sector of activity (4-digit
NACE Rev. 2 code), 5-digit zip code of location, net operating revenue, material expenditures
(cost of all raw materials and services purchased by the firm in the production process), labor
expenditures (total wage bill, including social security contributions), and total fixed assets.24
The second dataset is the foreign transactions registry collected by the Bank of Spain (Banco
de Espan˜a). For both exports and imports, it contains transaction-level information on the fiscal
identifier of the Spanish firm involved in the transaction, the amount transacted, the product code
(SITC Rev. 4), the country of the foreign client, and the exact date of the operation (no matter
when the payment was performed). Starting in 2008, however, the dataset’s information on the
product code and on the destination country became unreliable. The reason for this is that the
entities reporting to the Bank of Spain were given the option of bundling a set of transactions
together. In those cases, each entry reflects only the country of destination and product code
of the largest transaction in that bundle (see Appendix B for more details). This feature of the
dataset precludes us from studying exports at the firm-product-destination-year level, but we can
still reliably aggregate this transaction-level data to obtain information on total export volume by
firm and year.
This international trade database has an administrative nature because Banco de Espan˜a legally
requires financial institutions and external (large) operators to report this information for foreign
transactions above a fixed monetary threshold. Until 2007, the minimum reporting threshold was
fixed at 12,500 euros per transaction. Since 2008, information must be reported for all transactions
performed by a firm during a natural year as long as at least one of these transactions exceeds
50,000 euros. In order to homogenize the sample, for the period 2000 to 2007, we only record a
positive export flow in a given year for firms that have at least one transaction exceeding 50,000
euros in that year (for more details see Appendix B).
In both datasets, a firm is defined as a business constituted in the form of a Corporation
(Sociedad Ano´nima), a Limited Liability Company (Sociedad Limitada), or a Cooperative (Coop-
erativa). We merge both datasets using the fiscal identifier of each firm. Using the merged database,
we define each firm’s domestic sales as the difference between its total annual net operating revenue
and its total export volume, which motivated our discussion of measurement error in Section 2.
To confirm the validity of the information contained in the resulting dataset, we compare its
coverage with the official publicly available aggregate data on output, employment and total wage
bill (from National Accounts) and on goods exports (from Customs). Figure 3 shows that our
dataset tracks nearly perfectly the aggregate evolution over time of output, employment, total
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Figure 3: Output, Employment, Wage Bill and Export Dynamics
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payments to labor, and exports. Due to the reporting thresholds described above, aggregate exports
in our sample naturally fall a bit short of aggregate exports in the Customs data, but note that
the gap is very similar in the boom and bust periods (the average coverage is 91.8% in 2000-08 and
91.3% in 2009-13).25
We complement the firm-level data described above with yearly municipality-level data on the
stock of vehicles and on total population. The information on the stock of vehicles by municipality
is provided by the Spanish Registry of Motor Vehicles (Direccio´n General de Tra´fico), while the
information on the population by municipality is provided by the Spanish National Statistical Office
(Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica). When matching this municipality-level data with our firm-level
data, we need to deal with the fact that the information on the location of firms is provided at the
zip code level, and that the mapping between municipalities and zip codes is not one-to-one. More
precisely, larger municipalities are often assigned multiple zip codes and, in a very small number of
cases, a single zip code is assigned to more than one municipality. In the former case, we associate
the same value for the stock of vehicles and population to all firms located in the same municipality,
independently of the zip code of location; for firms in zip codes containing multiple municipalities,
we construct a zip code-level instrument by averaging the stock of vehicles per capita across these
municipalities.
25Most of the gap in coverage is explained by the fact that a nontrivial share of Spanish exports recorded by
Customs is carried out by legal entities or individuals that are not registered as firms undertaking economic activity
in Spain, and are thus exempted from submitting their financial statements to the Commercial Registry. The share
of goods exports by non-registered entities was on average around 8% in 2010-2013 (own calculations based on public
Customs data).
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26Figure C.2 in Appendix C.2 shows the annual average number of firms and exporters by province for the period
2002-2008. Economic activity in Spain is concentrated mostly in the coast (Galicia, Basque Country, Catalonia,
Valencian Community, Murcia and Andalusia) and in the center (Madrid). Exporting firms are concentrated in the
center (Madrid) and in the Mediterranean coast (Catalonia and Valencian Community).
When exploring the robustness of our results, we use information on additional variables. The
underlying sources for these variables are discussed in Appendix B.
4 Identification Approach
In this section, we first describe our identification approach, and later highlight various potential
threats affecting this approach and how we seek to address them.
4.1 Identification Approach
As explained in Section 3.1, a key characteristic of the Great Recession in Spain is that it affected
different regions differently. Panel (a) in Figure 4 illustrates this fact. The figure plots the stan-
dardized percentage change in domestic sales for the average firm located in each of the 47 Spanish
peninsular provinces and operating in at least one year of the boom period (2002-2008) and at least
one year of the bust period (2009-2013).26 The provinces where the average firm experienced a
reduction in domestic sales smaller than the national average are in darker color, while those where
the average firm experienced a larger reduction in domestic sales are in lighter color. Specifically,
Figure 4 illustrates that firms located in the northern and western regions saw changes in domestic
Figure 4: The Great Recession in Spain: Variation Across Provinces
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Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the standardized percentage change in average firm-level domestic sales between the
period 2002-2008 and the period 2009-2013. Therefore, if this variable takes any given value p for a given province,
it means that the average firm located in this province experienced a relative change in average yearly domestic
sales between 2002-2008 and 2009-2013 that was p standard deviations above the change experienced by a firm
located in the mean province. Panel (b) illustrates the standardized percentage change in cars per capita between
the period 2002-2008 and the period 2009-2013. Therefore, if this variable takes any given value p for a given
province, it means that this province experienced a relative change in vehicles per capita between 2002-2008 and
2009-2013 that was p standard deviations above the change experienced by the mean province.
sales larger (less negative) than the average, while firms located in the center of the country and
in southern and eastern regions experienced relatively large domestic sales reductions.
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The heterogeneity in the changes in domestic sales that we document in panel (a) of Figure 4
could have been caused by heterogeneity in supply factors or by heterogeneity in factors affecting
local demand for manufacturing goods. We next propose an approach to attempting to measure
variation in local demand for manufacturing goods.
Our approach consists in proxying changes in local demand for manufacturing goods using
observed changes in demand per capita for one particular type of manufacturing products: vehicles.
Panel (b) in Figure 4 shows that there is substantial variation in the degree to which the number of
vehicles per capita changed across provinces between the boom and the bust years.27 Specifically,
the provinces in the Northwest and in the Southwest experienced a relative increase in the number
of vehicles per capita, while the region around Madrid and the provinces in the Northeast and along
the Mediterranean cost experienced a relative reduction.
By illustrating provincial averages, the maps in Figure 4 hide substantial spatial variation at
the sub-province level (across 5-digit zip codes) in both the boom-to-bust changes in average firm-
level domestic sales and in the boom-to-bust changes in the number of vehicles per capita. We
illustrate this variation in Figure 5 for the case of the two most populated provinces in Spain:
27Changes in the number of vehicles per capita between the boom and the bust years could have been due either
to purchases of new vehicles or to scrapping of old ones. We measure the change in the stock, rather than just new
purchases, to avoid contamination from the “cash for clunkers” program (Plan PIVE) that the Spanish government
put in place during the bust period.
Madrid and Barcelona. To facilitate a comparison of the within-province across-zip codes variation
illustrated in Figure 5 with the across-province variation illustrated in Figure 4, the average zip
code changes illustrated in Figure 5 have been standardized using the Spain-wide mean and cross-
province standard deviation used to standardize the corresponding variables in Figure 4.
Panels (a) and (b) reveal a large heterogeneity in the change in both firms’ average domestic
sales and vehicles per capita across zip codes located in the region of Madrid: while the center
area of the region that contains a large number of tightly packed zip codes (this area corresponds
to the city of Madrid) experienced small reductions in firm average domestic sales (relative to the
Spain-wide average), surrounding zip codes experienced changes in domestic sales that were more
than two standard deviations above the national average. Similarly, while the zip codes belonging
to the city of Madrid experienced a large reduction in the number of vehicles per capita (more
than two standard deviations smaller than the Spain-wide average), other zip codes to the east,
north and west of the city of Madrid saw increases in vehicles per capita significantly above the
national average. Panels (c) and (d) provide analogous information for the region of Barcelona.
Although the heterogeneity across zip codes located in the province of Barcelona is smaller than
that observed within the Madrid region, panel (c) still shows that certain zip codes experienced
growth rates smaller than the national average while others experienced changes in firm average
domestic sales more than a standard deviation above that average.
In the next section, we exploit the variation illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 to identify the impact
of a local demand shock on firms’ exports operating through its effect on the firms’ domestic (Spain-
wide) sales. Specifically, we divide our sample into a “boom” period (2002-08) and a “bust” period
(2009-13), and assess the extent to which a demand-driven decline in domestic sales in the bust
period relative to the boom period is associated with a relative increase in export sales between
these two periods. With this aim, we will use observed “boom-to-bust” changes in the stock of
vehicles per capita at the zip code level as a proxy for the changes in the aggregate demand for
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manufacturing goods that the corresponding geographical area experienced in the bust relative to
the boom period. Equipped with this proxy for local goods demand, we will use it to instrument
for firm-level changes in domestic sales for firms located in that zip code.
Our identification strategy is based on three main pillars. First, it builds on the fact that
durable goods consumption, and vehicle purchases in particular, are strongly procyclical and thus
are a useful proxy for changes in ‘local demand’, i.e., the overall propensity of an area’s inhabitants
to consume (see Stock and Watson, 1999). Consistent with this notion, Mian and Sufi (2013)
document how variation in the extent to which the U.S. subprime mortgage default crisis of 2007-10
affected household housing wealth in different areas in the United States translated into geographical
variation in vehicle purchases. It would be interesting to tie the geographical variation in the change
in the stock of vehicles per capita in Spain to the housing slump, but idiosyncratic features of the
Spanish housing market complicate such an analysis. In Section 6, we revisit this issue and explore
the robustness of our results to an alternative shifter of firms’ domestic sales that uses a determinant
of the housing supply elasticity in a given zip code as a proxy for the magnitude of the negative
impact of the Great Recession on household housing wealth and consumption.
The second building block of our identification strategy is that changes in zip code-level demand
are a good predictor for changes in domestic (Spain-wide) sales of Spanish firms producing in
the corresponding zip code. This would naturally be the case if domestic sales of firms were
disproportionately localized in the zip code in which production takes place. Indeed, as mentioned
in the Introduction, Hillberry and Hummels (2008) document the existence of such a ‘zip code home
bias’ in U.S. manufacturers’ shipments. Dı´az-Lanchas et al. (2013) present analogous evidence for
Spain. We cannot replicate these results with our data, but we document in Appendix C.3 the
existence of significant home bias in manufacturing shipments with data at the province level.28
The third and final pillar of our identification approach is ensuring that changes in local vehicle
purchases per capita are not correlated with supply shocks that might have an independent effect
on the exporting decisions of Spanish firms. This exclusion restriction is central to the validity
of our strategy, so we next outline how it might be violated and how we will deal with potential
threats to identification.
28More specifically, we find that own-province sales shares range from a low 18% in Transport Equipment (an
industry we exclude from our analysis, as explained in the next section) to a high of 43% for Nonmetallic Minerals.
The overall provincial home-bias in manufacturing is 28% (see Figure C.3 in Appendix C.3). The data on province-
to-province shipments comes from the C-Intereg database (for details on this database, see Llano et al., 2010.)
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Figure 5: The Great Recession in Madrid and Barcelona: Variation Across Zip Codes
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Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the standardized percentage change in average firm-level domestic sales between the
period 2002-2008 and the period 2009-2013. Therefore, if this variable takes any given value p for a given zip code,
it means that the average firm located in this zip code experienced a relative change in average yearly domestic sales
between 2002-2008 and 2009-2013 that was p standard deviations above the change experienced by a firm located in
the (Spain-wide) mean zip code. Panel (b) illustrates the standardized percentage change in cars per capita between
the period 2002-2008 and the period 2009-2013. Therefore, if this variable takes any given value p for a given zip code,
it means that this zip code experienced a relative change in vehicles per capita between 2002-2008 and 2009-2013
that was p standard deviations above the change experienced by the (Spain-wide) mean zip code. Zip codes that do
not host any of the firms in our dataset appear in white, with the label “No data”.
4.2 Threats to Validity of the Instrument
The main concern with our approach is that the geographical variation in our demand measure
might be correlated with geographical variation in unobserved supply shocks. While we cannot test
this exclusion restriction formally, we address this endogeneity concern in two different ways.
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29If sector fixed effects had not been included in our specifications and textile firms were to be on average located
in Spanish regions that suffered larger negative local demand shocks, our estimates would confound the impact of
the MFA expiration and the negative local shocks.
First, we control in our specifications for sector and location (province) fixed effects and for firm-
specific measures of productivity and labor costs. By controlling for sector fixed effects, we base our
identification on observing how domestic sales and exports changed between the boom and the bust
for different firms operating in the same sector but located in regions that experienced different
changes in the stock of vehicles per capita. For example, these sector fixed effects control for shocks
such as the expiration of the Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA) on January 1, 2005, which eliminated
all European Union quotas for textiles imported from China and which had a large impact on both
the domestic sales and exports of Spanish textile manufacturers.29 By controlling for changes
in wages and productivity at the firm level, we aim to identify the effect that changes in local
demand had on firms’ exports through channels other than the internal devaluation channel. More
specifically, these controls help address the concern that the reduction in unit labor costs observed
in Spain during the period 2009-13 might have been heterogeneous across different Spanish regions
in a manner that is correlated with our demand measure. This concern also motivates the inclusion
of province fixed effects, with which we seek to control for unobserved variation in factor costs and
productivity that is not picked up by our proxies for these variables.30
Our second approach to assuage endogeneity concerns is motivated by the fact that our various
fixed effects and proxies for firm-level productivity and wage costs might not perfectly capture
supply-side factors, and that unobserved, residual supply shocks might be correlated with our
proxy for changes in local demand. For instance, if a disproportionate share of cars in Spain
was sold in the municipalities in which car producing plants are located, then negative residual
supply shocks affecting those car plants and their workers could well generate a correlation at the
municipality level between car purchases and domestic sales. The Spanish motor vehicles sector
represented on average around 7% of manufacturing employment during this period, so this is not
an unreasonable concern, though we should stress that roughly 75% of cars purchased in Spain are
imported (as indicated by data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics). To deal with
this threat to identification, in all regressions presented in the next section we exclude all firms
operating in the auto industry (NACE Rev. 2 code 29). To further assuage this, in Section 6 we also
explore how our results are impacted when excluding from our sample: (i) all firms located in a zip
code that hosts at least one firm in the auto industry employing more than 20 workers; (b) all firms
located in a zip code or in the neighborhood of a zip code with a significant share of manufacturing
employment accounted for by the auto industry; and (c) all firms producing in sectors that are
either leading input providers or leading buying industries of the vehicles manufacturing industry.
In Section 6, we also perform several additional robustness tests of the vent-for-surplus hypoth-
esis. Specifically, (i) we explore whether various heterogeneous effects are in line with what one
would expect if the vent-for surplus mechanism was operating, (ii) we present IV estimates using
alternative instruments for firms’ domestic sales that exploit different variation in the data, (iii)
we present regressions that control for several additional confounding factors, and finally, (iv) we
perform falsification tests.
30As our instrument only varies at the municipality level and we use information only in one long time-difference,
it is not feasible to introduce municipality fixed effects.
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5 Baseline Results
5.1 Intensive Margin
Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the elasticity of “boom-to-bust” changes in firms’ export flows
with respect to “boom-to-bust” changes in domestic sales for continuing exporters – i.e., firms that
exported both in the boom as well as in the bust. There are 8, 018 such firms in our dataset.
As discussed in Section 2, when no controls are included in the regression, we expect to observe
a positive relationship between a firm’s changes in domestic and foreign sales. This positive rela-
tionship is indeed observed in column 1 of Table 1, in which we estimate an elasticity of export
flows with respect to domestic sales of 0.131. In the remaining columns of Table 1, we control for
various sources of marginal cost heterogeneity across firms, with the aim of controlling for sources
of correlation between firms’ exports and domestic sales other than those captured by the vent-
for-surplus mechanism. In columns 2 and 3, we control for log changes in firms’ observed marginal
costs. Specifically, in column 2 we control for the change in firms’ productivity (estimated following
the procedure in Gandhi et al., 2016, as detailed in Online Appendix F), and in column 3 we control
for the change in firms’ average wages (reported by the firm in its financial statement). Consistent
with the discussion in Section 2, controlling for these supply shocks reduces the OLS estimate of the
coefficient on domestic sales. In fact, the coefficient turns negative (−0.228), indicating that, once
we control for the observable part of firms’ supply shocks, domestic sales and exports are negatively
correlated. Columns 4, 5 and 6 aim to control for additional unobserved determinants of firms’
marginal costs that are time varying. To do so, and motivated by the specification in equation (10),
we sequentially add sector fixed effects (in column 4) and location fixed effects (in columns 5 and
6). In the latter case, we first include province fixed effects and, in column 6, we instead include
municipality fixed effects. The resulting estimates continue to be negative and indicate that a 10%
Table 1: Intensive Margin: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) 0.131a -0.147a -0.228a -0.217a -0.204a -0.186a
(0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
ΔLn(TFP) 1.057a 1.298a 1.375a 1.357a 1.336a
(0.045) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053)
ΔLn(Avg. Wages) -0.590a -0.540a -0.525a -0.482a
(0.047) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054)
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 7,507
R-squared 0.005 0.088 0.106 0.146 0.158 0.265
Sector FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Province FE No No No No Yes No
Municipality FE No No No No No Yes
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are reported in parenthesis. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the difference in
Ln(X) between its average in the 2009-2013 period and its average in the 2002-2008 period. The estimation
sample includes all firms selling in at least one year in the period 2002-2008 and in the period 2009-2013.
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31In Online Appendix G, we present OLS regressions using the full firm-year data for the period 2002-2013. Our
results are quite similar to those in Table 1. Without controlling for supply factors, changes in domestic sales are
positively associated with changes in exports. However, once we control for observable determinants of firms’ marginal
costs and for various fixed effects, we estimate a negative elasticity of exports to domestic sales. This elasticity is
around−0.3 and thus somewhat larger (in absolute value) than the one obtained in our “long differences” specification.
In Online Appendix G, we also explore variation in the elasticity of exports with respect to domestic sales across
sectors.
decrease in a firm’s domestic sales, keeping its productivity and average wages constant, implies
around a 2% increase in its aggregate export flows.31
One might be concerned that, because firms’ total sales are a key input in the computation
of our TFP measure, our empirical results are just unveiling a mechanical negative correlation
between exports and domestic sales once one holds total sales revenue constant (by controlling
Table 2: Intensive Margin: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales) ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -2.185a -1.346a -1.393a -1.602a
(0.622) (0.359) (0.350) (0.437)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.336a 0.447a 0.437a 0.363a
in Municipality) (0.060) (0.066) (0.065) (0.068)
ΔLn(TFP) 0.785a 0.948a 0.936a 1.991a 2.396a 2.657a
(0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.286) (0.339) (0.409)
ΔLn(Avg. Wages) -0.544a -0.447a -1.225a -1.149a
(0.031) (0.036) (0.205) (0.206)
F-statistic 31.17 46.39 45.00 28.32
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018
Sector FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Province FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality appear in parenthesis. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the log difference between the average of X in
2009-2013 and its average in 2002-2008. Vehicles p.c. denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. Columns 1-4
contain first-stage estimates; columns 5-8 contain second-stage estimates. F-statistic denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Ln(Vehicles p.c. in municipality) equals zero.
for it). Although log TFP and log total sales are obviously positively correlated (as one would
expect in light of our model), the correlation is far from perfect, particularly when considering log
changes in these variables. More specifically, the correlation between log changes in TFP and log
changes in total sales in our yearly data is 0.31, while it is 0.54 when looking at boom-to-bust
“long differences” in these variables. To further assuage this concern, in Section 6.4 we explore the
robustness of our results to alternative measures of log firm TFP that feature a lower correlation
with log firm sales.
In Table 2, we turn to our two-stage least squares estimates of the elasticity of the firm’s “boom-
to-bust” change in exports with respect to its “boom-to-bust” demand-driven change in domestic
sales. The first-stage estimates (reported in columns 1 to 4 and illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure
C.4 in Appendix C.4) reveal that firms located in municipalities that experienced a larger drop in
the stock of vehicles per capita also suffered a larger decline in their domestic (Spain-wide) sales.
This relationship is robust to controlling for our measures of firms’ changes in productivity and
labor costs and for sector and province fixed effects: the statistic of an F -test for the null hypothesis
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that changes in the stock of vehicles per capita in a region have no impact on the domestic sales
of the firms located in that municipality is comfortably above widely accepted critical values in all
specifications.
The second stage estimates (reported in columns 5 to 8) reveal elasticities of exports with
respect to domestic sales that are significantly larger (in absolute value) than the OLS elasticities
reported in Table 1.32 This is true regardless of whether one controls for sector and province
32We illustrate the reduced-form relationship between the change in the log number of vehicles per capita of a
fixed effects as well as for changes in our measures of the firm’s productivity and labor costs. Our
preferred estimate in column 8 indicates an elasticity of exports with respect to domestic sales of
around −1.6. These significantly more negative IV elasticities are consistent with the hypothesis,
formalized in equation (11), that, even after controlling for sector and location fixed effects and for
firm proxies of productivity and average labor costs, there still remains unobserved determinants of
firms’ marginal costs that induce a spurious positive correlation between their sales in the domestic
and foreign markets.
An elasticity of −1.6 does not necessarily imply a more-than-complete substitution of exports
for domestic sales. For a firm with an initial export share of χ%, a demand-driven drop of e100 in
their domestic sales would lead to a e160× χ/ (1− χ) increase in exports. For example, for every
e100 of lost domestic sales, a firm with an export share of 25% would able to recoup e53.3 via
exports, while a firm with an export share of one-third would be able to recoup e80.33
5.2 Extensive Margin
We next turn to studying the causal impact of demand shocks on the extensive margin of exporting.
As in our intensive margin regressions, we divide the sample period into a boom (2002-08) and a bust
period (2009-13), and explore how demand-driven changes in domestic sales affect firms’ probability
of exporting in each of these two periods. More specifically, we implement a two-stage least squares
estimator of a linear probability model in which a firm’s dummy capturing positive exports in a
given period (boom or bust) is regressed on firm and sector-period fixed effects, province-period
fixed effects, the log of firm-level average TFP in that period, the log of average wages in that
period, and the log of average domestic sales in that period, with log domestic sales instrumented
with the average stock of vehicles per capita in the firm’s municipality of location during that
period.34 Besides this linear probability model, we also estimate analogous specifications in which
we substitute the dependent variable by a variable capturing the proportion of years in a given
period (boom or bust) for which a firm exports.
The results are presented in Table 3. Column 1 reports the first stage for our full sample of
62,904 firms. As in Table 2, and given the inclusion of firm fixed effects, the results indicate that
domestic sales fell more for firms located in municipalities with a larger decline in the stock of
vehicles per capita. The F-stat (14.49) is, as in our intensive margin specifications, above standard
critical values. Columns 2 and 3 then present OLS and IV estimates of the link between domestic
sales and export status, while columns 4 and 5 report OLS and IV estimates of the link between
municipality and the change in log exports of the firms located in the corresponding municipality in Panel (b) of
Figure C.4 in Appendix C.4.
33The median export share among the 8,018 firms exporting in both boom and bust periods is 16.5%.
34Our results to an alternative specification in which the left-hand-side variable is a dummy variable that treats a
firm as an ‘exporter’ only if it exports for two or more years in a given period.
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domestic sales and the proportion of years exported. The results of these two specifications deliver
very similar results. First, the OLS estimates in columns 2 and 4 suggest a positive relationship
between domestic sales and the propensity to export. When isolating demand-driven variation
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by zip code appear in parenthesis. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the log difference between the average of X in 2009-2013
and its average in 2002-2008. Vehicles p.c denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. All specifications include firm
fixed effects, sector-period fixed effects, and province-period fixed effects.
in domestic sales, however, the coefficient in column 3 turns negative and suggests that a 10%
drop in domestic sales leads to a 1.07% increase in the probability of exporting. This effect is,
however, very imprecisely estimated and it is thus not possible to reject the null hypothesis that
demand shocks have no impact on the extensive margin of exporting. The same conclusion applies
to column 5, which presents an estimate of the causal effect of demand shocks on the proportion
of years exported.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 lead us to conclude that the vent-for-surplus mechanism
did not appear to operate via the extensive margin. This result is perhaps not entirely surprising
in light of the fact, discussed in Section 3.2, that more than 90% of the growth in Spanish exports
during the bust period was explained by the intensive margin.
6 Robustness
In this section, we complement our baseline results with a series of robustness tests that further
support the empirical relevance of the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism, and that address some specific
sources of endogeneity that could affect the validity of our baseline identification strategy. Given
the non-significant results obtained in Table 3 regarding the extensive margin of exports, we focus
throughout this section on exploring the robustness of the intensive margin results in Table 2.
Table 3: Extensive Margin: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: Export Dummy Proportion of Years
1st Stage OLS 2nd Stage OLS 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Domestic Sales) 0.040a -0.107 0.021a -0.071
(0.003) (0.181) (0.002) (0.094)
Ln(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) 0.089a
(0.023)
Ln(TFP) 1.075a 0.038a 0.196 0.050a 0.148
(0.016) (0.005) (0.195) (0.003) (0.101)
Ln(Average Wages) -0.408a -0.024a -0.084 -0.031a -0.068c
(0.011) (0.004) (0.074) (0.003) (0.038)
F-statistic 14.49
Observations 125,808 125,808 125,808 125,808 125,808
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.183 0.183 0.113 0.113
Ext-Margin Elasticity 0.221 -0.584 0.181 -0.622
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Table 4: Intensive Margin: Robustness to Excluding Zip Codes Linked to Auto Industry
Panel A: Exclude zipcodes w/ Panel B: Exclude zipcodes with
high auto employment share at least one sizeable auto maker
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales)ΔLn(Exp) ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales)ΔLn(Exp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.218a -2.382a -0.235a -2.787a
(0.030) (0.535) (0.038) (0.694)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.328a 0.318a
in Municipality) (0.075) (0.088)
ΔLn(TFP) 1.349a 0.936a 3.361a 1.348a 0.898a 3.624a
(0.057) (0.032) (0.501) (0.072) (0.043) (0.630)
ΔLn(Avg. Wages) -0.487a -0.436a -1.428a -0.526a -0.408a -1.561a
(0.052) (0.037) (0.253) (0.071) (0.047) (0.322)
F-statistic 19.04 13.11
Observations 7,178 7,178 7,178 4,613 4,613 4,613
Panel C: Exclude zipcodes ‘ne- Panel D: Exclude sectors w/
ighboring’ zipcodes in Panel A I-O links to automakers
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales)ΔLn(Exp) ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales)ΔLn(Exp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.204a -2.487a -0.179a -2.443a
(0.033) (0.632) (0.031) (0.579)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.332a 0.339a
in Municipality) (0.085) (0.067)
ΔLn(TFP) 1.324a 0.928a 3.428a 1.298a 0.933a 3.396a
(0.062) (0.032) (0.583) (0.063) (0.035) (0.538)
ΔLn(Avg. Wages) -0.471a -0.404a -1.390a -0.520a -0.413a -1.448a
(0.058) (0.037) (0.276) (0.060) (0.037) (0.252)
F-statistic 15.42 25.32
Observations 6,137 6,137 6,137 6,080 6,080 6,080
in a municipality was caused by an exogenous increase in marginal costs affecting the firms in the
motor vehicles industry, and this negative supply shock was transmitted to other firms within the
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered by
municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include sector and province fixed effects. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the
log difference between the average of X in 2009-2013 and its average in 2002-2008. ‘Exp’ denotes exports, and ‘DSales’
denotes domestic sales. ‘Vehicles p.c.’ denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. ‘F-statistic’ denotes the corresponding
statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) covariate is equal to zero.
6.1 Further Purges of the Auto Industry
While the sample used to compute the estimates in Table 2 excludes firms classified in the man-
ufacturing of motor vehicles sector (see Section 4.2), one might still be concerned that the salient
presence of firms in that industry in a given municipality might lead to a negative association
between the boom-to-bust changes in the stock of vehicles per capita and in the unobserved resid-
ual marginal costs shifters of the firms located in that municipality (even if they operate in other
industries). This would be the case if the boom-to-bust drop in the number of vehicles per capita
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same municipality, reducing the aggregate labor demand in this municipality.35 Notice however
that this source of endogeneity in our instrument would cause our baseline two-stage least squares
estimates presented in Table 2 to be upward biased, as unobserved shocks that increase firms’
marginal costs would have a negative impact on their exports. In order to evaluate the robustness
of our estimates to this concern, we report in Table 4 our two-stage least squares estimates for
four alternative samples. In Panel A, we exclude from our sample all firms located in a zip code
that ranks in the top 25% of zip codes by share of manufacturing employment accounted for by
motor-vehicles producers (as computed from our micro-level data). In Panel B, we further restrict
the sample relative to Panel A by excluding all firms located in a zip code in which at least one
motor-vehicles producer with more than 20 workers operates. In Panel C, we exclude all firms from
‘neighboring’ zip codes sharing the first four digits with a zip code that ranks in the top 25% of zip
codes by share of manufacturing employment in motor-vehicles producers. Finally, in Panel D, we
exclude all firms producing in sectors that are either one of the two top leading input providers or
two top leading buying industries of the vehicles manufacturing industry. The results in all panels
point at slightly larger estimated elasticities (in absolute value), consistently with the notion that
these sample restrictions attenuate concerns about our estimates being up upward biased. Notice
however that, as a consequence of the reduction in sample sizes, the standard errors also increase
significantly.
6.2 Heterogeneous Effects
Our first-stage and second-stage intensive margin specifications in Table 2 do not allow for hetero-
geneity in how firms are affected by local demand shocks and how they might respond to them.
However, the ‘vent-for-surplus’ interpretation of the results suggests plausible sources of hetero-
geneity in both the first-stage coefficient on the instrument and in the second-stage coefficient on
the log change in domestic sales.
For instance, it seems reasonable to expect smaller firms to see their domestic (Spain-wide) sales
being more impacted by municipality-specific demand shocks than larger firms. This means that,
as long as it is the case that our instrument is truly capturing changes in local demand between
the boom and bust periods, we should expect the elasticity of a firm’s domestic sales with respect
to our instrument to be larger for smaller firms.36 This is indeed what we observe in columns 1 to
5 of Table 5. The elasticity of the boom-to-bust change in log domestic sales with respect to the
log change in the stock of vehicles per capita in the municipality of location of the firm is around
35For example, the post-2009 trade collapse may have increased the input costs for firms in the motor vehicles
industry, which may have passed these higher costs through to their buyers, which may be other firms located in the
same municipality but operating in different industries.
36Notice that there would be no immediate reason to expect that one should observe this heterogeneity if it were
to be the case that the boom-to-bust log change in the number of vehicles per capita in a municipality is exclusively
operating as a proxy for unobserved supply shocks affecting the firms located in such municipality.
0.5 for firms with less than 25 employees and around 0.3 when we consider only firms with more
than 25 employees (columns 1 and 2 of Table 5). Restricting the sample further to firms with more
than 50 employees does not have an statistically significant effect the elasticity of interest (column
3), but this one becomes close to 0.2 when we focus only on firms with more than 100 employees
(column 4) and below 0.1 when we do so with firms with more than 200 employees (column 5).
In the latest case, we actually cannot reject the null hypothesis that the first-stage elasticity of
interest is zero.
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Whenever a municipality experiences a drop in demand, the ‘vent-for-surplus’ mechanism pre-
dicts that firms located in it will try to recoup the lost sales in some other market. However, the
larger the trade costs of shipping goods from such municipality to other markets that a firm faces,
the harder it is for this firm to shift their sales towards new markets and, thus, the larger the
elasticity of their domestic (Spain-wide) sales with respect to changes in demand in their munici-
pality of location is expected to be. We cannot measure trade costs for each firm but we use the
share of total shipments of a sector that remain within the same province of the municipality of
origin (i.e. provincial ‘home bias’) to proxy for those ‘outward’ trade costs at the sectoral level. We
then classify firms into low and high home bias firms depending on whether the provincial home
bias of their sector is below or above the sectoral median. Consistently with the prediction of the
‘vent-for-surplus’ mechanism, we find that the elasticity of the boom-to-bust change in domestic
sales with respect to the change in the stock of vehicles per capita is larger (0.436 vs. 0.305) in
those sectors that are more inward-oriented (see columns 6 and 7 in Table 5).37
Table 6 presents patterns of heterogeneity in the second-stage elasticity of the boom-to-bust
change in exports with respect to the boom-to-bust change in domestic sales that are informative
Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects: First Stage
Sample:
Number of workers is in the interval: Low Home High Home
(0, 25] [26,∞) [51,∞) [101,∞) [201,∞) Bias Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st-Stage Coefficient 0.516a 0.316a 0.331a 0.223c 0.074 0.305a 0.437a
(0.117) (0.073) (0.095) (0.121) (0.154) (0.094) (0.085)
F-Statistic 19.47 18.78 12.19 3.37 0.23 10.60 26.57
Observations 2,641 5,376 3,190 1,672 790 4,768 3,249
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include sector and province fixed effects. Vehicles p.c.
denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. First-stage coefficient and F-statistic refer to the elasticity of the change
in the firm’s log domestic sales with respect to the change in log vehicles p.c. in the municipality of location of
the firm. For columns 1 to 5, the firm’s number of workers is measured as the average across all years the firm
appears in the sample. In columns 6 and 7, we classify firms into low and high home bias firms depending on
whether the provincial home bias of their sector is below or above the sectoral median.
37Analogously to the discussion in footnote 36, the heterogeneity in the first-stage elasticities documented in
columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 is hard to rationalize under a hypothetical interpretation of our baseline results that
maintains that our instrument is operating as a proxy for unobserved residual supply shocks in a municipality.
about the economic mechanisms underlying the relationship between demand-driven changes in
domestic sales and exports. First, while our baseline specification in equation (10) imposes a
constant elasticity between changes in exports and demand-driven changes in domestic sales, it is
natural to expect the percentage change in exports following a given percentage change in domestic
sales to be larger for firms with initially lower export shares.38 As the results in columns 1 and 2
of Table 6 show, the elasticity of changes in exports to demand-driven changes in domestic sales is
indeed larger for firms with a lower (pre-sample) propensity to export (elasticity of -3.034 versus
-0.839 for firms with high export propensity).
38E.g. if a firm is attempting to recoup e100, 000 in lost domestic sales, which constitute a 10% drop in domestic
sales, the required percentage increase in exports will be larger if the firm initially exported e111, 000 worth of goods
(i.e., an initial trade share of 10%) than if it initially exported e250, 000 (i.e., an initial trade share of 20%).
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39See Appendix A.2 for a formalization of the link between the slope of the short-run marginal cost function and
the elasticity of output with respect to flexible inputs.
Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects: Second Stage
Sample Low High Low High Low High
prov-sec prov-sec Labor Labor Materials Materials
Exp. share Exp. share Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd-Stage Coefficient -3.034b -0.839c -1.606b -1.350b -2.019b -1.078b
(1.177) (0.460) (0.684) (0.645) (0.853) (0.523)
1st-Stage F -Stat. 10.23 24.98 19.76 12.22 9.90 20.55
Observations 4,005 4,009 3,914 3,914 4,100 3,711
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include sector and province fixed effects. Vehicles p.c.
denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. First-stage coefficient and F-statistic refer to the elasticity of the change
in the firm’s log domestic sales with respect to the change in log vehicles p.c. in the municipality of location of
the firm. In columns 1 and 2, we classify firms on the basis of province- and sector-specific export shares. In
columns 3 to 6, we classify firms on the basis of firm-specific labor and materials elasticities computed following
the procedure in Bilir and Morales (2018).
If the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism is important in explaining the growth in Spanish exports
during the Great Recession, then one would expect the increase in exports in reaction to a common
demand-driven drop in domestic sales to be larger for those firms whose short-run marginal cost
function is steeper or, equivalently, for those firms whose elasticity of output with respect to flexible
inputs is lower.39 Columns 3 and 4 test this hypothesis when we identify our flexible input as labor,
and columns 5 and 6 do so when we consider materials to be our flexible input. Our results generally
confirm that the elasticity of the change in exports to changes in domestic sales is indeed higher for
firms having lower output elasticities with respect flexible inputs. One should notice however that,
while the difference in the estimates is large when we classify firms according to their materials
output elasticity (-2.019 vs. -1.078), it is much smaller when we do so according to their labor
output elasticity (-1.601 vs. -1.350). This may reflect the rigidity of the Spanish labor market and
the consequent difficulties that Spanish firms faced during the bust period to adjust downwards
their labor force in reaction to the drop in domestic demand.
6.3 Alternative Instruments
We next revert back to the baseline specification discussed in Section 5.1, but explore the robustness
of the results presented in Table 2 to alternative instruments.
We first construct two alternative instrumental variables that are analogous to our baseline one
except for the fact that they measure the change in the stock of vehicles per capita not only in
the municipality of location of a firm but also in surrounding municipalities. The first alternative
instrument measures the change in the stock of vehicles per capita at the province level.40 A
change in demand in the province of location of a firm will directly affect a larger share of the
firm’s domestic sales than a change in demand affecting only the municipality of location; thus, as
long as the change in the stock of vehicles per capita is actually a demand proxy, we should expect
the elasticity of a firm’s domestic sales with respect to our province-level instrument to be larger
40Provinces are significantly larger than municipalities: while there are over 8,000 municipalities in Spain, there
are only 50 provinces.
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41Conversely, if the correlation between firms’ domestic sales and the change in the stock of vehicles per capita
that we document in columns 1 to 4 of Table 2 was due to our instrument operating as a proxy for firms’ unobserved
marginal cost shifters, we would expect the elasticity of domestic sales with respect the province-level measure of our
instrument to be lower than that with respect to the municipality-level measure, as the former would be a more noisy
proxy of the supply factors relevant to the firm.
42In our baseline measure, we weight each zip code by its population divided by the logarithm of its distance to the
zip code where the corresponding firm is located. We have experimented with alternative weights, such as dividing
population by power functions of distances, and have found qualitatively very similar results.
than our baseline elasticity with respect to our municipal-level instrument. This is indeed what we
find when we compare the first-stage estimate in column 1 of Table 7 to that in column 4 of Table
2 (0.853 vs. 0.363).41
The second alternative instrument is a distance- and population-weighted sum of the change in
the stock of vehicles per capita in all zip codes other than the zip code in which the firm is located.42
If the change the stock of vehicles per capita was just a proxy for unobserved supply shifters, one
would expect the change in vehicles per capita in a municipality to be a sufficient statistic for all
relevant shifters affecting the firms located in such municipality. Reassuringly, the distance- and
population-weighted sum of the change in the stock of vehicles per capita in other municipalities
is correlated with firms’ change in domestic sales even after controlling for the change in vehicles
per capita in its own municipality (see column 3 in Table 7).
The different instrumental variables exploited so far rely on the change in the stock of vehicles
per capita in a municipality being a proxy for demand changes in that municipality, but do not take
a stance on the primitive sources or causes of the demand changes. We next construct alternative
instruments that attempt to better capture the deep roots of the Great Recession in Spain. As
described in Section 3.1, the Great Recession in Spain is largely driven by a real state bubble.
Our third instrument thus attempts to identify an exogenous source of the intensity of the bubble
across different locations. More precisely, we construct ratios of available ‘buildable’ urban land
to urban land with already built structures in the year 1996 (a year sufficiently removed from
the housing boom). We conjecture that this ratio is a proxy for the housing supply elasticity in
a given municipality and that municipalities with lower housing supply elasticities should have
experienced larger housing price increases during the boom years and, as a result, larger reductions
in household wealth and consumption during the bust years.43 This alternative instrumentation
strategy is however not without limitations: a potential threat to its validity is the fact that housing
supply elasticities could also operate as shifters of the firm’s marginal costs, by affecting the cost
of non-residential structures (i.e., factories).44
Relatedly, we also use a fourth alternative instrument related to the construction sector. The
burst of real state bubble affected directly the construction sector. As mentioned in footnote 19,
the share of total employment in the construction sector peaked at 13.5% in the summer of 2007
and then collapsed, reaching 5.4% by early 2014. A larger share of the workers employed in the
construction sector during the boom ended up unemployed during the bust period. These workers
saw their consumption capacity severely reduced in the bust period relative to the boom. Conse-
quently, one may conjecture that the boom-to-bust drop in demand for manufacturing products
was larger in those municipalities for which the construction sector was a particularly important
43Indeed, we show in Appendix C.5 that there is a negative cross-sectional correlation between these housing supply
elasticities and housing price growth during the boom years 2004-07.
44More specifically, municipalities with a lower housing supply elasticity might have experienced larger boom-to-
bust reductions in the cost of land, which might have contributed to a larger relative export growth for firms located
in those municipalities.
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source of income during the boom years. Accordingly, we use the 2002 construction wage bill share
in a municipality, interacted with the log change in the national construction wage bill between the
boom and the bust, as a determinant of the boom-to-bust changes in demand in the corresponding
municipality.45
Our fifth and last alternative instrument is motivated by the importance of tourism revenue for
the Spanish economy. Driven by the drop in demand in foreign countries, the number of foreign
tourists visiting Spain peaked in 2007 at 58.66 millions visitors, before falling by more than 10%
to 52.18 million and 52.68 million visitors in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Because tourism revenue
accounts for roughly 10% of Spanish GDP, and because the decline in foreign visitors affected
different regions in Spain differently, this generates an alternative source of geographical variation
in local demand. We use a 2002 province-specific measure of exposure to tourism shocks, interacted
with the log change in tourists at the national level between the boom and the bust, as an instrument
for the boom-to-bust changes in demand in the corresponding province. Our measure of exposure is
in this case the number of foreign tourists that visited a province in 2002 divided by the population
45The relevance and validity of our instrument does not depend on the fact that we multiply the municipality-
specific 2002 construction wage bill share by the boom-to-bust log change in the national construction wage bill,
which is common to all observations in our regression. We introduce this shifter in our shift-share instrument for the
sake of facilitating the interpretation of the first-stage coefficient on this instrument. When interpreting our results,
one should bear in mind then that identification must come then from assumptions imposed on the distribution of the
2002 construction wage bill. See Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) for a discussion of identification in this context.
Conversely, neither the identification approach in Borusyak et al. (2018) nor the discussion on inference in Ada˜o et
al. (2018) are applicable to our context.
46Considerations analogous to those in footnote 45 apply here.
of the province in the same year.46
In Table 7, we report the results obtained under these different alternative instruments. As
column 1 demonstrates, despite the differences in the first-stage coefficients on the province-level and
the municipality-level measures of the change in the stock of vehicles per capita, our second-stage
province-level results generate a response of exports to a fall in domestic (Spain-wide) sales very
similar to that in our baseline (-1.425 vs. -1.602). Consequently, the Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions clearly fails to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. The results
we obtain under the distance- and population-weighted vehicles per capita instrument in columns
2 and 3 are equally reassuring.
One might argue that the fact that we fail to reject the null hypothesis in the test of overi-
dentifying restrictions performed in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 7 is not surprising, since these
alternative instruments use a source of variation that is quite similar to that used in our baseline
specification. In that respect, the results we obtain when using as instruments our observed housing
supply determinant, the 2002 municipality-level construction wage bill or the 2002 province-level
tourism share are more revealing. Although the first-stage F-test statistics associated with two of
these instruments are below ten and, thus, one should be cautious interpreting the corresponding
second-stage estimates, it is worth remarking that the sign of all first-stage coefficients is as ex-
pected, and that the second-stage elasticities of exports to domestic sales are quite similar in value
(−1.595, −1.568, and −1.179, respectively) to those obtained with our benchmark instrumentation
strategy in Table 2. Furthermore, the p-values of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
are very large (0.51, 0.99 and 0.97, respectively). In sum, these results enhance our confidence in
the existence of a causal relationship between demand-driven changes in domestic sales shocks and
changes exports, with an elasticity roughly equal to −1.6.
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Table 7: Alternative Instruments and Overidentification Tests
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.853a
in Province) (0.223)
ΔLn(Distance-Population 0.260a 0.184a
Weighted Vehicles p.c. (0.028) (0.040)
in Other Zip Codes)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.296a
in Municipality) (0.086)
Ln(Urban Land Supply 0.029b
Ratio in 1996) (0.012)
ΔLn(Construction Wage Bill) × 0.331a
2002 Wage Bill Share (0.054)
in Municipality
ΔLn(Foreign Tourists) × 0.280a
2002 Foreign Tourists p.c. (0.098)
in Province
F-statistic 14.61 86.02 43.02 6.36 38.33 8.18
ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -1.425a -1.628a -1.336a -1.595c -1.568a -1.179a
(0.400) (0.527) (0.395) (0.927) (0.535) (0.257)
P-value for Sargan Test 0.46 0.34 0.34 0.51 0.99 0.97
Observations 8,018 7,949 7,949 6,940 7,928 8,018
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by province except for columns 4 and 5, in which they are clustered by municipality. All specifications include firm-
level log TFP and log average wages as additional controls (coefficients not included to save space). Additionally,
all specifications also include sector fixed effects, and columns 4 and 5 also include province fixed effects.
6.4 Controlling for Additional Confounding Factors
In spite of the controls included in our baseline specification, one may still be concerned that this
specification might not be accounting for the effect of marginal cost shifters that could be correlated
with our instrument, thus biasing our estimates. More specifically, one might be concerned that our
firm-level measures of average wages and TFP are too crude to fully capture changes in firm-level
supply conditions even when additionally controlling for sector and province fixed effects.
For instance, the dual nature of the Spanish labor market, with large differences in pay and job
security between temporary- and permanent-contract workers, might have led certain firms to shed
a disproportionate number of temporary, lower-paid workers during the bust. If so, conditional
on the observed changes in our measure of average wages, our TFP measure could significantly
underestimate the export potential of firms undergoing such skill-upgrading (or, at least, experience-
upgrading). Similarly, our baseline specifications do not include any proxies for factor costs other
than labor costs, yet it is likely that financial costs faced by firms (explicit via interest rates, or
implicit via rationing) were also significantly impacted by the Great Recession.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 8 present variants of our baseline specification that include controls for
various alternative confounding factors related to the labor costs. Although all regressions reported
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47We obtain similar results when instead controlling for the (initial) firm-level share of temporary workers during
the boom period. Specifically, firms that entered the bust with a larger share of temporary workers (and thus had
a larger potential to affect their skill composition when transitioning to the bust period) experienced higher export
growth in the bust relative to the boom, but the causal impact of domestic shocks on exports is largely unaffected.
in Table 8 also include the controls included in our baseline specification, to save space, we do not
include these estimates. To facilitate the comparison, we replicate in column 1 our baseline results
in column 8 of Table 2. In column 2, we additionally control for the firm-level change in the
share of temporary workers. The results suggest that firms that shed a disproportionate number
of temporary workers during the bust period experienced a larger increase in exports, which is
in line with our hypothesis above. The IV estimate of the causal effect of demand shocks on
exporting is however only slightly lowered (elasticity of −1.443).47 In columns 3 and 4, we introduce
municipality-level controls for local labor market conditions. Column 3 includes the same change in
Table 8: Confounding Factors
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -1.602a -1.443a -1.655a -1.677a -1.416a -1.383a -1.667a
(0.437) (0.434) (0.480) (0.478) (0.450) (0.435) (0.481)
ΔShare of Temp. Workers -0.302b
(firm level) (0.118)
ΔShare of Temp. Workers -0.068
(municipality level) (0.194)
ΔManufacturing Empl. p.c. -0.266a
(municipality level) (0.057)
ΔLn(Financial Costs) -0.031b
(firm level) (0.014)
Ln(Financial Costs in Boom) -0.000
(firm level) (0.016)
Ln(Financial Costs in Boom) 0.023
(municipality level) (0.035)
F-Statistic 28.32 25.83 25.34 24.82 24.07 24.81 25.26
Observations 8,018 7,649 7,746 7,748 6,886 6,952 7,743
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality are included in parenthesis. All specifications include firm-level log TFP and log wages as
additional controls (coefficients not included to save space). All specifications also include sector and province
fixed effects.
the ratio of temporary workers over total employment as in column 2, but computed with aggregate
data at the municipality level. In column 4, we further control for a municipality-level measure of
the change in the manufacturing employment per capita. The inclusion of these two controls has a
negligible impact on the main coefficient of interest, and only the second of these municipality-level
variables has a significant effect on exporting.48
In columns 5 to 7 of Table 8, we study potential confounding effects related to financial costs. We
construct a measure of the financial costs that each firms faces in each period as the within-period
average ratio of financial expenditures over total outstanding debt with financial institutions (both
measures are annually reported by firms in their financial statements). As the results in column
48More specifically, firms located in municipalities with larger declines in manufacturing employment per capita
experienced higher export growth, presumably due to workers extra effort in reaction to the reduction in employment
opportunities in their municipality.
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5 illustrate, the impact of this measure on firms’ changes in exports is not statistically different
from zero, and including this variable has only a effect on the estimate of the elasticity of exports
to domestic sales (which drops to −1.416). In columns 6 and 7, we explore the possibility that the
relevant increase in the financial costs faced by firms in the bust relative to the boom happened
through credit rationing, instead of via explicit interest rates. Although we do not have measures
of firms’ credit applications and whether these were denied, one may conjecture that firms whose
financial costs were larger in the boom were more likely to suffer credit rationing in the bust. No
matter whether we measure financial costs in the boom using each firm’s information (in column 6)
or as the average financial costs of all other firms located in the same municipality (in column 7),
our results indicate that either credit rationing had little impact on firms’ exports, or our conjecture
that it may be measured through the financial costs in the boom has little empirical support.
6.5 Alternative Productivity Estimates
We next test the robustness of our results to alternative approaches to measuring firms’ productivity.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 replicate our baseline OLS and IV estimates presented in column 6 of
Table 1 and column 8 of Table 2, respectively, and columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 present estimates of
specifications that differ exclusively on the productivity measure.
Consistently with the model described in Section 2, both productivity measures exploit the
assumptions that firms: (a) face a CES demand function and are monopolistically competitive in
both the domestic and the foreign market; (b) take all factor prices as given. The two approaches
we implement differ however on the assumptions we impose on the shape of the production function.
In our baseline approach, we assume that the firm’s production function is a Leontief aggregator
of materials and a translog function of labor and capital (as in Ackerberg et al., 2015). Given
these assumptions, we describe our estimation procedure in detail in Online Appendix F. A pos-
sible concern with this estimation approach is that, if it were to be the case that materials are
not perfect complements with the output of labor and capital, our measure of the firm’s produc-
tivity would automatically incorporate a measure of the firm’s materials’ usage. This would be
problematic for our identification approach, as firms may adjust their materials’ usage directly in
reaction to a demand-driven change in domestic sales. To address this possible concern, the second
approach assumes instead that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of materials
and the same translog function of labor and capital employed in our baseline approach (see Bilir
and Morales, 2018, for details on the estimation procedure). Thus, while our baseline approach
imposes that material inputs have a zero elasticity of substitution with the output of labor and
capital, the second approach imposes instead a unit elasticity of substitution.
In both estimation approaches, we invoke optimality conditions for the static inputs (labor and
materials) in order to estimate the relevant parameters of the production function and, in this sense,
both approaches are specific cases of the general estimation framework in Gandhi et al. (2016).
Both estimation approaches do however use different outcome measures; while the approach that
assumes a Leontief production function exploits data on the firm’s sales revenue, the approach that
assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function uses information on the firm’s value added. We thus
refer in Table 9 to the two measures of productivity that we obtain as “TFP Sales” and “TFP
Value Added”, respectively.
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A general concern with our productivity estimates is that, if they do not correctly account for
the impact of different factors of production on the firm’s total sales, they may just become an
imperfect proxy of these total sales, which would cause our estimate of the elasticity of exports with
respect to demand-driven changes in domestic sales to be biased downwards. We should however
Table 9: Alternative TFP Measures
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.204a -1.602a 0.105a -1.285a
(0.027) (0.437) (0.026) (0.486)
ΔLn(Avg. Wages) -0.525a -1.149a -0.514a -0.873a
(0.051) (0.206) (0.064) (0.152)
ΔLn(TFP Sales) 1.357a 2.657a
(0.051) (0.409)
ΔLn(TFP Value Added) 0.807a 1.218a
(0.060) (0.161)
F-Statistic 28.32 24.99
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance.
Standard errors clustered by municipality. All specifications include firm-level log average
wages and sector and province fixed effects as additional controls.
point out that our measures of productivity are far from being perfectly correlated with the firm’s
total sales; specifically, this correlation is 0.55 for our baseline approach and 0.23 for our alternative
approach. The higher correlation of our baseline approach is consistent with it partly accounting
for the firm’s usage of material inputs.
A second concern with our productivity estimates is that, as we do not observe separately
prices and quantities for each firm, they may capture no only the firm’s actual productivity but
also the firm’s demand shifter. Specifically, this would be a concern if our productivity estimates
were implicitly already controlling for the impact of our instrument. There is however no empirical
evidence of this happening: the correlation between the boom-to-bust change in the number of
vehicles per capita in the municipality of location of the firm and our productivity measures is very
close to zero and its sign is actually negative (it is -0.04 for our baseline approach and -0.11 for our
alternative approach).
Perhaps reflecting the lower correlation between our alternative productivity proxy and the
firm’s total sales, the OLS estimator in column 3 reveals a positive partial correlation between
exports and domestic sales. However, the IV elasticity in column 4 is again negative and, though
it is slightly lower in absolute value than in our baseline specification (see column 2), we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that this elasticity is equal to the baseline estimate of −1.602.
6.6 Placebo Tests of First-Stage Results
One could be concerned that the estimated impact of our instrument on firms’ domestic sales (see
columns 1 to 4 in Table 2) may due to the presence of underlying trends in economic conditions
that affect both of these two variables and that are heterogeneous across municipalities in Spain.
To evaluate the plausibility of this concern, we present in Table 10 the results of two related
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Table 10: Placebo Tests of First Stage
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales)
Sample: Boom firms Bust firms
Within Boom vs. Within Boom vs.
Boom Bust Bust Bust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) -0.041 0.184b -0.009 0.277a
(0.080) (0.074) (0.071) (0.070)
Observations 5,344 5,344 5,245 5,245
F-statistic 0.27 6.19 0.02 15.63
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard
errors clustered by municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include firm-level log TFP
and log average wages as additional controls. These coefficients are not included to save space. All
specifications also include sector and province fixed effects. The sample use to compute the estimates
in columns 1 and 2 includes all firms active in at least one year in the subperiod 2002-05 and in at
least one year in the subperiod 2006-08. The sample use to compute the estimates in columns 3 and
4 includes all firms active in at least one year in the subperiod 2009-11 and in at least one year in
the subperiod 2012-13.
falsification tests. In column 1, we break the boom period into two subperiods, 2002-05 and
2006-08, and evaluate whether our instrument (changes in demand between the boom and the
bust periods) predicts the changes in domestic sales across these two subperiods. In column 3,
we perform a similar exercise but with a dependent variable that measures changes in domestic
sales between two subperiods included in the bust period, 2009-11 and 2012-13. If the correlation
between changes in domestic sales and changes in the stock of vehicles per capita documented in
the first four columns of Table 2 was due to underlying trends, the lack of synchronization between
the time frames at which the endogenous variable and the instrument are measured should not
affect the capacity of the latter to predict the former. However, as the results in columns 1 and
3 of Table 10 illustrate, the effect of our instrument in these placebo exercises is not statistically
different from zero (the statistic of the F-test is below 0.3 in both cases) and, furthermore, the
point estimates we obtain are very close to zero.
A possible concern with the interpretation of these placebo results is that they might be driven
by the fact that the sample of firms in each of these placebo tests is different than in our baseline
regressions (see notes to Table 10 for details). With that in mind, in columns 2 and 4 of Table
10 we repeat our baseline specifications comparing the boom (2002-08) to the bust (2009-13) for
both the change in domestic sales and in the instrument, but for the same sample of firms used to
compute the estimates reported in columns 1 and 3, respectively. In both cases, we continue to find
a positive and statistically significant effect of the instrument on domestic sales, but the effect is
admittedly much stronger in column 4 (with an F -stat of 15.63) than in column 2 (with an F -stat
of 6.19).
6.7 Additional Robustness Tests
We finally perform a number of additional robustness tests. To save space, we include the exact
estimates in Appendix D and focus here on summarizing the main findings. First, we show in Table
D.1 that our results are not affected when excluding multinational subsidiaries operating in Spain
from our sample, when weighting observations by the number of years a firm is active in export
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7 Structural Interpretation and Quantification
There is an obvious tension between our empirical results suggesting a negative impact of demand-
driven changes in domestic sales on changes in exports, and the theoretical framework we describe
in Section 2 to organize our empirical analysis. In this section, we show how a simple extension
of that framework incorporating non-constant marginal costs delivers insights consistent with our
empirical results. We close this section by using the extended framework to provide a quantitative
assessment of the importance of the domestic slump for the observed export miracle in Spain during
the period 2009-13.
7.1 Structural Interpretation
The theoretical environment we consider here is identical to that in Section 2, except that the cost
structure in equation (2) is now replaced with a total variable cost of producing Qid units of output
for the domestic market and Qix units of output for the foreign market given by
1
ϕi
ωi
1
λ+ 1
(τdQid + τxQix)
λ+1 , λ ≥ 0, (14)
where τdQid + τxQix denotes firm i’s total output in the presence of iceberg trade costs in the
domestic (τd) and foreign (τx) markets. Notice that the parameter λ governs how steeply marginal
costs increase with output. When λ = 0, marginal costs are constant and equation (14) reduces
to our previous expression in equation (2). In Appendix A.2, we develop a micro-foundation for
the cost function in equation (14) in a model in which a firm’s short-run production capacity is
limited by a fixed factor and the elasticity of output with respect to the variable factors is below
one. Under this micro-foundation, the parameter λ is decreasing in the elasticity of output with
respect to the variable factor, and λ = 0 when this elasticity is equal to one.
Solving for the optimal level of exports by firm i, and taking log differences, our model delivers
Δ lnRix = (σ − 1) [Δ ln ξix +Δ lnϕi −Δ lnωi]− (σ − 1) (Δ ln τsx −Δ lnPsx) + Δ lnEsx
− (σ − 1)λΔ ln (τdQid + τxQix) , (15)
which is analogous to equation (4) except for the last term, which reflects the positive effect of total
output on the marginal cost of production. Next, note that, due to constant mark-up pricing, we
can write
markets, or when defining the bust period as 2010-2013 or 2011-13 instead of 2009-13. Second,
we experiment in Table D.2 with additional variants of our instruments in Tables 2 and 7. More
specifically, holding the municipality-level population constant at its 2002 level when computing
the number of vehicles per capita in each municipality in both the boom and the bust periods has
a negligible effect on our estimates. We also show that vehicles per capita both at the municipality
and at the province-level remain significant when including them simultaneously in the first stage
regression, and that our construction-sector instrument delivers similar results when it is based on
employment shares or turnover shares, rather than on wage bill shares.
ln (τdQid + τxQix) = ln
(
τdRid
Pid
+
τxRix
Pix
)
= ln (Rid +Rix)− ln
(
σωi (τdQid + τxQix)
λ
(σ − 1)ϕi
)
. (16)
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Solving for ln (τdQid + τxQix), plugging this expression into equation (15), and imposing the same
decomposition as in equation (5), we then find that:
Δ lnRix = γsx+γx+
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
δϕΔ ln(ϕ
∗
i )−
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
δωΔ ln(ω
∗
i )−
(σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
Δ ln (Rid +Rix)+εix, (17)
where εix ≡ uξix+((σ−1)/(1+λ))(uϕi −uωi ). Note that this equation is analogous to the estimating
equation (10) suggested in Section 2, except that it features the log difference of total sales (and
not just domestic sales) on the right-hand side. The intuition for the need to include the change
in total sales rather than in domestic sales as an explanatory variable is straightforward: marginal
costs of production are increasing in total output, not just output destined for the domestic market.
Estimating equation (17) via OLS is problematic not just for the reasons identified in Section
2 but also because the inclusion of the log change in exports as part of one of the right-hand-side
variables generates an additional mechanical upward bias when estimating (σ − 1)λ/ (1 + λ). Note,
however, that our instrumental variable approach continues to deliver consistent estimates of this
coefficient provided that the only way that the instrument affects exporting is by affecting a firm’s
change in domestic sales and not by affecting exporting directly. In other words, as long as the
instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction, estimating equation (17) via our instrumental variable
approach should deliver consistent estimates of (σ − 1)λ/ (1 + λ).
In Table 11, we present OLS and two-stage least squares estimates of equation (17). In columns
1 to 3, we use the same productivity proxy ϕ∗i as in previous tables. In columns 4 and 5, we
additionally control for the initial stock of capital, as indicated by the micro-foundation in Appendix
A.2. As expected, the OLS estimates in column 1 indicate a strong positive correlation between
exports and total sales, even when including all the controls and fixed effects in equation (17).
The first-stage results in column 2 indicate that our baseline instrument is a strong predictor of a
firm’s total sales (not just its domestic sales), with an F-stat of 23.42. Finally, the second-stage
elasticity of exports to total sales in column 3 is negative and significant and stands at a value of
−2.624. Adding the firm-specific stock of capital in the bust period does not affect significantly
the first-stage nor the second-stage results. Thus, henceforth, we treat the estimates in column 3
of Table 11 as our baseline estimates.
To understand the magnitude of our estimates of the elasticity of exports with respect to
domestic-demand-driven changes in total sales, take a firm with an initial export share of 16.5%
(which corresponds to median export share during the boom in our sample of 8,018 continuing
exporters). Suppose that, due to a drop in demand, this firm experiences a 10% drop in its domestic
sales. Our estimated elasticity of exports to domestic sales in Table 2 indicates that, other things
equal, the firm should see its exports increase by 16%. This also implies that the firm’s total sales
will decrease by 83.5% × 10% + 16.5% × (−16%) = 5.71%. Our estimated elasticity of exports to
total sales in Table 11 then suggests an implied increase in exports of 5.71% × 2.624 = 14.98%,
which is quite close to 16%. This demonstrates that our IV results in Tables 2 and 11 deliver
congruent estimates for the response of exports to local demand shocks.49
49In Online Appendix H, we present results for specifications analogous to those in Tables 1 to 10, with the only
difference that the boom to bust log change in total sales is included as right-hand-side variable instead of the
corresponding log change in domestic sales. The conclusions discussed in Section 6 are generally corroborated by the
results shown in Online Appendix H.
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Table 11: Intensive Margin with Total Sales
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exp) ΔLn(TotSales) ΔLn(Exp) ΔLn(TotSales) ΔLn(Exp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Δ Ln(Total Sales) 0.785a -2.624a -2.771a
(0.037) (0.916) (0.962)
Δ Ln(TFP) 0.397a 0.985a 3.741a 0.931a 3.670a
(0.053) (0.024) (0.900) (0.024) (0.894)
Δ Ln(Avg. Wages) -0.095b -0.432a -1.567a -0.416a -1.563a
(0.047) (0.031) (0.408) (0.030) (0.413)
Δ Ln(Vehicles p.c. 0.221a 0.213a
in Municipality) (0.046) (0.044)
Δ Ln(Stock of Capital) 0.120a 0.481a
(in bust period) (0.008) (0.121)
F-statistic 23.42 23.18
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018
Note: Standard errors clustered by municipality. All regressions include sector and province fixed effects.
Significance levels: ap<0.01, bp<0.05, *p<0.1.
With an estimate of the demand elasticity σ in hand, it is easy to infer an estimated value of λ
from the estimates in Table 11. Specifically, given the estimates in column 3, we can compute an
estimate of λ as λˆ = 2.624/ (σ − 2.624). For σ = 6 and σ = 5, we obtain λˆ = 0.77, and λˆ = 1.10,
respectively, which in both cases indicates a significant departure from constant marginal costs.
7.2 Quantification
In this final section, we attempt to evaluate the quantitative importance of the “vent-for-surplus”
channel for explaining the remarkable growth in Spanish exports during the period 2009-13. To
do so, we implement a three-step procedure. First, we measure for each sector s the boom-to-bust
changes in the Spain-wide aggregate domestic demand shifter Qsd ≡ Esd/Psd. Second, we compute
the impact of several counterfactual boom-to-bust changes in Qsd on the aggregate domestic, for-
eign, and total sales of Spanish firms; we define the counterfactual changes in Qsd of interest as
fractions of the observed changes in this aggregate shifter. Third, we perform a variance decompo-
sition of the observed change in firms’ total sales with the aim of informing the degree to which the
boom-to-bust observed changes in Qsd are truly due to demand or supply shocks. In the remainder
of this section, we describe each of these three steps in detail. Finally, we conclude the section
describing the results of our quantification.
Measuring sector-specific changes in aggregate demand shifter. Defining an aggregate demand
shifter for sector s as Qsd ≡ Esd/Psd, we can rewrite the demand that any firm i faces in Spain in
any given period as Qid = (Pid/Psd)
−σQsdξσ−1id , where Psd is the sectoral price index,
Psd =
[ ∫
i∈Ds
(
Pid
ξid
)1−σ
di+
∫
i∈Xs
(
Pid
ξid
)1−σ
di
] 1
1−σ
,
and Ds and Xs denote, respectively, the set of sector s domestic and foreign firms selling in Spain.
To measure the boom-to-bust change in Qsd for every sector s, we first impose an equivalence
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between the total expenditure in Spain in sector s, Esd, and the sum of both the total domestic sales
of all firms located in Spain and classified in sector s, Rsd ≡
∫
i∈Ds Rid, and the Spanish aggregate
expenditure on imported goods in sector s, RXsd; i.e. Esd = Rsd + R
X
sd. Thus, we can write the
boom-to-bust change in the sector s aggregate demand shifter as
Qsd1
Qsd0
=
(
Rsd1 +R
X
sd1
Rsd0 +R
X
sd0
)/(
Psd1
Psd0
)
,
where, for any variable x, we denote as x1 and x0 their respective boom and bust values. We
measure Rsd1 and Rsd0 by aggregating the domestic sales of all firms in our dataset, R
X
sd1 and R
X
sd0
directly from the aggregate statistics on imports published by the Spanish Custom Agency, and
Psd1/Psd0 as the change in the Spanish Consumer Price Index.
Computing counterfactual changes in aggregate domestic sales and exports. Given our measure
Qsd1/Qsd0, we define each of the counterfactual changes in Qsd whose impact on firms’ exports and
domestic sales we study as
Q′sd1
Qsd0
= Γ
Qsd1
Qsd0
+ (1− Γ), (18)
where, for every variable x, we use x′1 to denote its counterfactual value in the bust period, and
1−Γ denotes the assumed contribution of demand shocks to the observed change in the aggregate
sectoral demand shifter. We can thus interpret the counterfactual in which we set the change in
the aggregate demand shifter to equal the expression in equation (18) as a counterfactual exercise
that predicts how firms’ aggregate domestic sales, exports, and total sales, would have changed if,
for every sector, we had eliminated the demand-driven component of the observed change in Qsd.
50
When computing the aggregate change domestic sales and exports that we would have observed
if the change in the demand shifter had been equal to Q′sd1/Qsd0, we maintain the boom-to-bust
changes in the supply parameters (ϕi, ωi, τsx, τsd) and in the firms’ idiosyncratic demand shifters
(ξid, ξix) at their realized values. Specifically, we use data on the observed changes in domestic sales
and exports of every Spanish firm to proxy for the boom-to-bust actual changes in the functions of
these supply and idiosyncratic demand parameters that are relevant for our counterfactual exercise.
When implementing our counterfactual exercise, we assume that Spain is a small open economy
and, thus, impose that counterfactual changes in the Spanish aggregate demand shifter do not
affect: (a) the boom-to-bust change in the foreign price index Psx and aggregate demand shifter
Qsx; (b) foreign firms’ marginal production costs. Assumption (a) implies that Spain is a small
exporter to the rest of the world; assumption (b) implies that Spain is a small importer from the
rest of the world.
Given our results regarding the extensive margin of trade in Table 3, we assume that firms do
not change their export status in reaction to our counterfactual change in the domestic demand
shifter and, thus, focus on computing the effect of such counterfactual change on firms that either
exported in both the boom and the bust periods, or that did not export in either period.
50Although, according to our model, changes in Qsd determine changes in the residual demand function that each
firm faces and, thus, from the perspective of each individual firm, are purely demand shifters, these changes in Qsd
may be due, in general equilibrium, to either changes in productivity of the average manufacturing firm (i.e. supply
shocks) or to changes in the propensity to consume of the average consumer (i.e. demand shocks). By setting it
equal to 1 − Γ, equation (18) implicitly imposes the assumption that the relative contribution of demand shocks to
the change in Qsd is the same for all sectors.
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51As discussed in Online Appendix F, our production function estimation approaches also allows us to recover
sector-specific estimates of σ. Depending on the period and the estimation procedure we use, we obtain average of
these estimates across sectors that oscillate between 3 and 4. We opt to perform our counterfactual exercise under
the calibrated value σ = 5 because our estimates crucially depend on a firm-specific measure of total variable costs.
In our context, this measure is likely subject to substantial measurement error as our dataset lacks information on
firms’: (a) total energy expenditure; (b) separate average wage measures for temporary and permanent workers.
Given a value ofQ′sd1/Qsd0, available on exports and domestic sales in boom and bust periods for
every firm, and values of the demand parameter σ, and of the composite parameter that determines
the within-firm elasticity of market-specific sales with respect to an exogenous change in total
sales, −((σ − 1)λ)/(1 + λ), the variant of the model described in Section 7.1 allows us to compute
the counterfactual change in domestic sales R′id1/Rid0 for every firm in the economy, and the
counterfactual change in exports R′ix1/Rix0 for every firm that exports a positive amount in the
boom and in the bust periods (see Appendix A.3 for details). We then aggregate these firm-
specific counterfactual changes to constructed counterfactual changes in aggregate domestic sales
and exports, R′d1/Rd0 and R
′
x1/Rx0.
In our baseline specification, we set σ to 5, which is a central value in the range of estimates
used in the international trade literature (see Head and Mayer, 2014), and we set ((σ−1)λ)/(1+λ)
to the estimated value of 2.624 (see Table 11).51
To perform our counterfactual analysis, we derive three sets of equations from the model de-
scribed in Section 7.1. The first set computes the counterfactual change in exports of every firm i
belonging to a sector s and that exports in both boom and bust periods:
ln
[
R′ix1
Rix0
]
= ln
[
Rix1
Rix0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
[
ln
(
R′ix1
Rix0
χi0 +
R′id1
Rid0
(1− χi0)
)
− ln
[
Ri1
Ri0
]]
, (19)
where χ0 ≡ Rix0/(Rid0 +Rix0) denotes the initial export share of firm i, and
R′ix1
Rix0
χi0 +
R′id1
Rid0
(1− χi0) and Ri1
Ri0
denote, respectively, the counterfactual and observed change in firm i’s total sales. The second set
of equations computes the counterfactual change in domestic sales of every firm i that belongs to
a sector s and that is active in both boom and bust periods:
ln
[
R′id1
Rid0
]
= ln
[
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1]
+ σ ln
[
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1]
+ ln
[
Rid1
Rid0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
[
ln
(
R′ix1
Rix0
χi0 +
R′id1
Rid0
(1− χi0)
)
− ln
[
Ri1
Ri0
]]
, (20)
where
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1
and
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1
,
denote the counterfactual change (relative to the actual change) in the aggregate sectoral demand
shifter and price index, respectively. Finally, the system of counterfactual equilibrium equations
includes an equation that yields the counterfactual change (relative to the actual change) in the
sectoral price index:
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ln
[
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1]
= ln
(
sDsd0
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
R′id1
Rid0
+ (1− sDsd0)
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1(P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1)σRXsd1
RXsd0
)
− ln
(
sDsd0
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
Rid1
Rid0
+ (1− sDsd0)
RXsd1
RXsd0
)
− ln
[
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1]
, (21)
where sDsd0 ≡ Rsd0/(Rsd0 + RXsd0) denotes the share of total expenditure in sector s that goes to
Spanish firms, sDid0 ≡ Rid0/Rsd0 denotes firm i’s share of total domestic sales of Spanish firms, and
RXsd1/R
X
sd0 denotes the observed boom-to-bust change in Spanish imports in sector s.
The counterfactual boom-to-bust changes in total exports and domestic sales predicted by our
model appear in Figure 6. For the set of firms that we use in our counterfactual analysis, aggregate
domestic sales dropped 15.92% between the boom and the bust periods and exports grew by 11.99%.
These are the values that our counterfactual analysis correctly generates when we set 1 − Γ = 0:
if the domestic slump had been entirely supply driven, then the vent-for-surplus mechanism would
not have been operative and boom-to-bust changes aggregate exports and domestic sales would not
be affected by a counterfactual that eliminates the contribution of demand shocks to the observed
change the sectoral aggregate demand shifters, Qsd1/Qsd0. Conversely, if the change in the aggregate
demand shifter had been entirely due to demand shocks, 1 − Γ = 1, our model predicts that, in
the absence of such demand shocks, aggregate domestic sales and aggregate exports would have
dropped by 0.48% and 1.20%, respectively.
Figure 6: Impact of “Vent-for-Surplus” on Aggregate Domestic Sales and Exports
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the value of the parameter 1 − Γ. Given a value of
1− Γ, the export and domestic sales growth rates indicated in the vertical axis correspond
to those predicted by equations (18) to (21).
Determining the contribution of the “vent-for-surplus” mechanism. Figure 6 indicates the pre-
dicted counterfactual growth rates in aggregate exports, domestic sales, and total sales for several
different values of the parameter 1 − Γ, which determines the relative contribution of demand
shocks to the boom-to-bust observed change in the sectoral aggregate demand shifters Qsd1/Qsd0.
To determine the empirically relevant value of this parameter, we perform a decomposition of the
cross-firm variance of the observed boom-to-bust changes in total sales. Specifically, on the basis of
equation (17), we decompose the variance of Δ ln(Ri), with Ri ≡ Rid+Rix, into a variance compo-
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52If we were to first residualize Δ ln(Ri) from the set of fixed effects and observed covariates included in equation
(17), var(εix) would explain 65% of the variance of the residualized values of Δ ln(Ri). Factors orthogonal to εix
would thus explain 35% of the boom-to-bust variation in the residualized log changes in domestic sales.
nent due to firms’ marginal cost and export demand shifters and a variance component attributed
to factors orthogonal to these shifters (see Appendix A.4 for details). When performing this decom-
position, we find the contribution of the combination of marginal cost and export demand shifters
to be 59%, and that of factors orthogonal to it to be 41%.52
The procedure we follow to estimate the contribution of demand to the domestic slump is
not without limitations. The variance decomposition that we implement reveals that 41% of the
variance of the changes in firms’ total sales is due to any residual factor that is orthogonal to firms’
marginal cost shifters and export demand shocks. Thus, we can conclude that 41% of the variance
in the firm-specific changes in total sales is due to demand factors if and only if we assume that
these demand factors are orthogonal to the firms’ marginal cost shifters and export demand shocks.
If this assumption were not to hold, our 41% measure would capture the relative contribution to
the variance of the changes in firms’ total sales of only those demand components that happen to be
orthogonal to the firms’ marginal cost and export demand shifters. In this case, our 41% measure
would be a lower bound on the contribution of demand shocks to the variance of the boom-to-bust
firm-specific changes in total sales.
Quantification results. Depending on whether the observed changes in the aggregate demand
shifter, Qsd1/Qsd0 were entirely supply driven (i.e. 1 − Γ = 0) or entirely demand driven (i.e.
1− Γ = 1), we would have observed a 9.60 percentage points difference (i.e. 10.23%-0.63%) in the
boom-to-bust drop in aggregate total sales of Spanish firms. From our variance decomposition,
one may infer that, in the absence of demand shocks, the boom-to-bust drop in aggregate total
sales would have been 10.23% + 41% × (0.63% − 10.23%) = 6.29%. This drop in aggregate total
sales is very similar to that predicted by our model when 1 − Γ = 0.4. We thus infer that the
empirically relevant value of the contribution of demand to the domestic slump, 1 − Γ∗, is close
to 0.4. At this value of the parameter 1 − Γ, our model predicts that, in the absence of demand
shocks, the growth in exports would have been 5.43%. Given that the observed growth in exports
was 11.99% (for 1 − Γ = 0), our analysis indicates that the vent-for-surplus mechanism explains
(11.99%-5.43%)/11.99% = 54.7% of the total drop in exports.53
Looking at other outcomes of our counterfactual analysis, our model also predicts that, in the
absence of any change in demand shocks between boom and bust periods, the total drop in domestic
sales would have been equal to 8.91%; equivalently, our model indicates that these demand shocks
explain (15.91%-8.91%)/15.91% = 44% of the drop in domestic sales.
Finally, our model illustrates that exporters and non-exporters would have been affected differ-
ently by the change in the domestic demand shifters; in the absence of these changes, the exporters’
aggregate domestic sales would have dropped by only 5.96% (in comparison to an observed dropped
of 12.91%), while that of non-exporters would have dropped by 19.04% (in comparison to an ob-
served dropped of 26.21%). In relative terms, our model predicts thus that demand shifters explain
53.83% and 27.16% of the observed dropped in the aggregate domestic sales of exporters and
non-exporters, respectively. This difference between exporters and non-exporters in their drop in
53As we show in Appendix C.6, when using an estimate of −((σ−1)λ)/(1+λ) equal to −1.819 (which is the largest
estimate among those arising from the robustness exercises presented in Online Appendix H), our analysis indicates
that the vent-for-surplus mechanism explains 44.1% of the total increase in exports.
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domestic sales reflects that the former were much less affected by the negative marginal costs shocks
(changes in productivity and wages) than the non-exporting firms.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence suggesting that export and domestic sales decisions are interde-
pendent at the firm level. Faced with a severe domestic slump during the Great Recession, Spanish
producers appear to have benefitted from their freed capacity and consequent reduction in marginal
production costs to increase their sales in foreign markets. We circumvent the inherent difficulties
associated with establishing a causal link between demand-driven changes in domestic sales and
exports by exploiting geographic variation in the incidence of the Great Recession in Spain.
Our empirical findings are inconsistent with international trade models featuring constant mark-
ups and technologies with constant marginal costs of production. We however rationalize and
interpret our results through the lens of a model with increasing marginal costs, and show that the
“vent-for-surplus” mechanism is powerful enough to explain approximately half of the growth in
Spanish exports in the period 2009-13.
Due to data limitations, we have restricted our analysis to the study of interdependencies
between the domestic market and a single (aggregate) export destination, and we have modeled
these interdependencies as arising exclusively from an increasing marginal cost function. With
access to data on firms’ exports and prices by destination market, one may potentially expand our
analysis to a multi-country environment featuring a rich set of market-specific extensive margin and
mark-up decisions. The interdependencies studied in this paper will naturally carry over to that
environment, complicating the estimation of some key parameters of multi-country export models.
However, we are hopeful that the tools in De Loecker et al. (2016), Antra`s et al. (2017), Arkolakis
and Eckert (2017), and Morales et al. (2018) will help surmount these complications and allow
researchers to further study the role of interdependencies in shaping the response of firms to shocks
to the world economy.
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Biases Due to Measurement Error
We discuss here the implications of measurement error in both total sales and exports whenever
domestic sales are computed by subtracting exports from the total sales of firms (see also, Berman
et al., 2015).
Suppose that one does not observe Rid directly, but instead infers it from Ri − Rix, where Ri
is used to denote the total sales of a firm. Assume furthermore that both Δ lnRi and Δ lnRix are
measured with error, so that
Δ lnRi = Δ ln R˘i +i
Δ lnRix = Δ ln R˘ix +ix,
where R˘i and R˘ix denote the true values of total sales and exports. Note then that
Δ lnRid = Δ lnRi −Δ lnRix = Δ ln R˘i −Δ ln R˘ix +i −ix,
Following the same steps as in the main text, we can reach an estimating equation analogous to
equation (10)
Δ lnRix = ds + d + (σ − 1) δϕΔ ln(ϕ∗i )− (σ − 1) δωΔ ln(ω∗i ) + βΔ lnRid + εix,
but we now have
εix = (σ − 1) [uξix + uϕi − uωi ] +ix.
Similarly, the error term in the expression for the change in domestic sales is given by
εid = (σ − 1) [uξid + uϕi − uωi ] +iT −ix.
It then follows that the probability limit of the OLS estimator of the coefficient on domestic sales
can we written as
plim(βˆOLS) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi + 1σ−1ix, uξid + uϕi − uωi + 1σ−1 (iT −ix))
var(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi + 1σ−1 (iT −ix))
.
This expression is analogous to that in equation (11) but it highlights the potential for additional
sources of bias related to the covariance between the measurement error terms ix and iT −ix.
The sign of this bias depends on the correlation between the measurement errors in total sales and in
exports. If these variables are constructed from different sources (e.g., total sales are obtained from
census data, while exports are drawn from customs data) it seems plausible that these measurement
errors will be orthogonal to each other, and the impact of measurement error in total sales and
exports on the bias in the OLS estimate βˆOLS will necessarily be negative. Nevertheless, if errors
in measurement of total sales and exports are highly correlated, it is possible for the bias resulting
from these errors in measurement to be positive, and particularly so when the variance of the
measurement error in total sales is larger than that of the measurement error in exports.
Consider next an IV estimator of β, where Δ lnRid is instrumented with a variable Zid. The
probability limit of this IV estimator is
plim(βˆIV ) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi + 1σ−1ix,Zid)
cov(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi + 1σ−1 (iT −ix) ,Zid)
.
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This expression illustrates that plim(βˆIV ) = 0 as long as the instrument Zid verifies three conditions:
(a) it is correlated with the change in domestic sales of firm i after controlling for (or partialling
out) sector and location fixed effects and the observable determinants of the firm’s marginal cost
that we include in our regression specification; (b) it is mean independent of the change in firm-
specific unobserved productivity, uϕi , factor costs, u
ω
i , and export demand u
ξ
ix; and (c) it is mean
independent of the measurement error in exports ix.
A.2 Convexity of the Short-run Marginal Cost Function
Suppose a firm’s production function depends on fixed or pre-determined input Ki and a flexible
and static input Li. Let us refer to the former as capital and the latter as labor. Assuming a Cobb-
Douglas technology in capital and labor, the cost minimization problem of a firm with productivity
ϕ seeking to produce a total amount of output Qi can be expressed as:
min ωiLi
s.t. ϕKαKi L
αL
i ≥ Qi,
where ωi denotes the nominal wage that firm i faces, and αK and αL denote then the output
elasticities with respect to capital and labor, respectively. The first-order condition of the cost-
minimization problem of the firm delivers
ωi = μαL
Qi
Li
ϕKαKi L
αL
i = Qi,
where μ denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint ϕKαKi L
αL
i = Qi. After solving for L in
the second of these equalities, we can rewrite short-run costs as a function of output, Qi, as follows
ωiLi = ωi (ϕK
αK
i )
− 1
αL (Qi)
1
αL .
Using ϕ˜i to denote a shifter of short-run marginal costs and λ to measure deviations of the short-run
marginal cost function from a linear benchmark,
ϕ˜i = αL (ϕK
αK
i )
− 1
αL
λ =
1− αL
αL
,
we can rewrite short-run costs as
ωiLi =
1
ϕ˜i
ωi
1
1 + λ
(Qit)
1+λ.
The elasticity of the short-run marginal costs function is thus
∂ ln(ωiLi)
∂ ln(Qit)
= 1 + λ.
Note that, the lower the value of αL (i.e. the lower the elasticity of output with respect to the flexible
input), the larger the elasticity with respect to output of the short-run marginal cost function. The
curvature of the marginal cost schedule is thus crucially shaped by the reciprocal of the output
elasticity of the flexible factor.
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A.3 System of Equations for Counterfactual Exercise
In order to perform our counterfactual exercises, the two key equations from our model are:
ln
[
Rix1
Rix0
]
= ln
[
Qsx1
Qsx0
]
+ (σ − 1) ln
[
ξix1
ξix0
]
+
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
[
ln
[
ϕi1
ϕi0
]
− ln
[
ωi1
ωi0
]]
− (σ − 1) ln
[
τsx1
τsx0
]
+ σ ln
[
Psx1
Psx0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
ln
[
Ri1
Ri0
]
(22a)
ln
[
Rid1
Rid0
]
= ln
[
Qsd1
Qsd0
]
+ (σ − 1) ln
[
ξid1
ξid0
]
+
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
[
ln
[
ϕi1
ϕi0
]
− ln
[
ωi1
ωi0
]]
− (σ − 1) ln
[
τsd1
τsd0
]
+ σ ln
[
Psd1
Psd0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
ln
[
Ri1
Ri0
]
(22b)
where ln[x1/x0] ≡ Δ lnx denotes the log change between the boom and the bust periods in any
covariate x, and remember that Rit = Rixt + Ridt for both t = 0 and t = 1. Equation (22a) is
implied by equations (15) and (16), and equation (22b) is analogous for the case of the domestic
market.
For any variable x, we define as x′1 the counterfactual value that this variable takes in the bust
period if the value that the aggregate domestic demand shifter takes in the bust period Q′sd1 and
all other demand and supply shocks had changed between boom and bust periods as they actually
did. Therefore, analogously to equations (22a) and (22b), we can define the following two equations
ln
[
R′ix1
Rix0
]
= ln
[
Qsx1
Qsx0
]
+ (σ − 1) ln
[
ξix1
ξix0
]
+
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
[
ln
[
ϕi1
ϕi0
]
− ln
[
ωi1
ωi0
]]
− (σ − 1) ln
[
τsx1
τsx0
]
+ σ ln
[
Psx1
Psx0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
ln
[
R′i1
Ri0
]
(23a)
ln
[
R′id1
Rid0
]
= ln
[
Q′sd1
Qsd0
]
+ (σ − 1) ln
[
ξid1
ξid0
]
+
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
[
ln
[
ϕi1
ϕi0
]
− ln
[
ωi1
ωi0
]]
− (σ − 1) ln
[
τsd1
τsd0
]
+ σ ln
[
P ′sd1
Psd0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
ln
[
R′i1
Ri0
]
(23b)
Note that equations (23a) and (23b) allow us to compute the impact of counterfactual demand
shocks ln[Q′sd1/Qsd0] on firms’ domestic sales and exports while holding the changes in the foreign
price index, Px, and in the equilibrium wages that each firm i faces, ωi, unaltered by the coun-
terfactual change in the demand shocks. In the case of non-exporting firms, only equation (23b)
applies for all these firms.
The assumption that the foreign price index is not affected by aggregate demand shocks in Spain
is consistent with Spain being a small country relative to the foreign one. Domestic equilibrium
wages would generally be affected by counterfactual changes in the aggregate demand term Esd.
Holding them at their observed path is however consistent with our aim of identifying the effect
of demand shocks on exports working exclusively through changes in the aggregate demand shifter
Qsd. In other words, by omitting from our analysis the impact that, in general equilibrium, demand
shocks may have had on equilibrium wages, we focus on the impact that these demand shocks have
on firms’ marginal production costs whenever these firms move along their marginal cost curve, but
without accounting for any shift in this curve.
From equations (23a) and (23b), it is easy to see that the counterfactual changes in firm i’s
exports, ln[R′ix1/Rix0], and domestic sales, ln[R
′
id1/Rid0], is a function of the actual changes in its
own supply shocks and idiosyncratic demand shocks{
ln
[
ϕi1
ϕi0
]
, ln
[
ωi1
ωi0
]
, ln
[
τsd1
τsd0
]
, ln
[
τsx1
τsx0
]
, ln
[
ξix1
ξix0
]
, ln
[
ξid1
ξid0
]}
(24)
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and, through the counterfactual change in the domestic price index, ln[P ′sd1/Psd0], of the actual
changes in the supply and idiosyncratic demand changes of all other firms that sell in the domestic
market.
Using the expression for equilibrium exports and domestic sales predicted by the model described
in Section 7.1, we can rewrite equations (23a) and (23b) in such a way that observed changes in
exports and domestic sales are used to measure the impact of the different elements listed in
equation (24) on the counterfactual change in exports and domestic sales. Specificially, we can
rewrite equation (23a) as
ln
[
R′ix1
Rix0
]
= ln
[
Rix1
Rix0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
[
ln
(
R′ix1
Rix0
χi0 +
R′id1
Rid0
(1− χi0)
)
− ln
[
Ri1
Ri0
]]
, (25)
where χ0 ≡ Rix0/(Rid0 +Rix0) denotes the initial export share of firm i, and
R′ix1
Rix0
χi0 +
R′id1
Rid0
(1− χi0) and Ri1
Ri0
denote, respectively, the counterfactual and observed change in firm i’s total sales. Similarly, we
can rewrite equation (23b) as
ln
[
R′id1
Rid0
]
= ln
[
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1]
+ σ ln
[
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1]
+ ln
[
Rid1
Rid0
]
− (σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
[
ln
(
R′ix1
Rix0
χi0 +
R′id1
Rid0
(1− χi0)
)
− ln
[
Ri1
Ri0
]]
, (26)
where
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1
and
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1
,
denote the counterfactual change (relative to the actual change) in the aggregate sectoral demand
shifter and price index, respectively.
Besides the set of counterfactual changes in exports, R′ix1/Rix0, and domestic sales, R
′
id1/Rid0,
of every firm i located in Spain, the additional unknown in the system of equations formed by
equations (25) and (26) is the counterfactual change in the domestic price index, P ′sd1/Psd0. In
order to understand how the domestic price index reacts to the supply and idiosyncratic demand
changes of all the firms that sell in the domestic market, it is useful to rewrite this price index in
any period t as
Psdt =
Esdt
Qsdt
=
Rsdt +R
X
sdt
Qsdt
, (27)
where Rsdt denotes the total domestic sales of firms located in country d and operating in sector
s, and RXsdt denotes the total imports of country d in sector s (i.e. total sales in country d by all
firms located in the foreign country). We can thus write the relative change in the domestic price
index between the boom and bust periods in sector s as
Psd1
Psd0
=
Rsd1 +R
X
sd1
Rsd0 +R
X
sd0
Qsd0
Qsd1
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or, equivalently,
Psd1
Psd0
=
(
Rsd0
Rsd0 +R
X
sd0
Rsd1
Rsd0
+
RXsd0
Rsd0 +R
X
sd0
RXsd1
RXsd0
)
Qsd0
Qsd1
.
Simplifying notation, we can write that
Psd1
Psd0
=
(
sDsd0
Rsd1
Rsd0
+ (1− sDsd0)
RXsd1
RXsd0
)(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1
,
where sDsd0 is the boom share of total consumption in country d spent in varieties produced by firms
located in the same country d. Noting that
Rsd1
Rsd0
=
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
Rid1
Rid0
we can rewrite the log counterfactual boom-to-bust change in the price index Psd relative to the
actual change as
ln
[
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1]
= ln
(
sDsd0
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
R′id1
Rid0
+ (1− sDsd0)
(RXsd1)
′
RXsd0
)
− ln
(
sDsd0
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
Rid1
Rid0
+ (1− sDsd0)
RXsd1
RXsd0
)
− ln
[
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1]
, (28)
A key element in this expression is the variable (RXsd1)
′/RXsd0, which denotes the counterfactual total
change in imports to country d in sector s; i.e. counterfactual change in Spanish imports in sector
s. Without loss of generality, we can rewrite
(RXsd1)
′
RXsd0
=
(RXsd1)
′
RXsd0
[
RXsd1
RXsd0
]−1RXsd1
RXsd0
=
∑
i∈Xs R
′
id1∑
i∈Xs Rid0∑
i∈Xs Rid1∑
i∈Xs Rid0
RXsd1
RXsd0
=
∑
i∈Xs
(
Rid0∑
i∈Xs Rid0
)
R′id1
Rid0∑
i∈Xs
(
Rid0∑
i∈Xs Rid0
)
Rid1
Rid0
RXsd1
RXsd0
=
∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
R′id1
Rid0∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
Rid1
Rid0
RXsd1
RXsd0
=
∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
P ′id1Q
′
id1
Pid0Qid0∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
Pid1Qid1
Pid0Qid0
RXsd1
RXsd0
,
where sXid0 is the share of firm i in total sales in market d by firms located in x (i.e. by firms
belonging to the set X ); i.e. share of total imports in market d that correspond to firm i. In
general, P ′id1 will differ from Pid1; i.e. differences in the aggregate demand shock in country d affect
the total quantity produced of all the firms located in country x and, thus, affect their marginal
cost and prices. However, assuming that market d is small for the firms located in country x (i.e.
only a very small share of total sales of firms located in country x correspond to sales in country
d; country d is “small” for foreign firms), it will be true that
P ′id1 = Pid1,
for all firms located in country x. Therefore, we can simplify the expression for the counterfactual
change in Spanish imports in sector s as
(RXsd1)
′
RXsd0
=
∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
Pid1
Pid0
Q′id1
Qid0∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
Pid1
Pid0
Qid1
Qid0
RXsd1
RXsd0
, (29)
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and we can write
Q′id1
Qid0
=
(
Pid1
Pid0
)−σQ′sd1
Qsd0
(
P ′sd1
Psd0
)σ(ξid1
ξid0
)σ−1
, (30)
Qid1
Qid0
=
(
Pid1
Pid0
)−σQsd1
Qsd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)σ(ξid1
ξid0
)σ−1
, (31)
where, as we have previously done for the case of the firms located in Spain, we set the change in
the idiosyncratic demand shocks of the foreign firms to equal the actual change (i.e. ξ′id1 = ξid1)
with the aim of having a counterfactual that isolates the impact of the aggregate domestic demand
shock. Therefore, plugging equations (30) and (31) into equation (29), we can further rewrite the
expression for the counterfactual change in Spanish imports in sector s as
(RXsd1)
′
RXsd0
=
∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
(
Pid1
Pid0
)1−σ Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
P ′sd1
Psd0
)σ(
ξid1
ξid0
)σ−1
∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
(
Pid1
Pid0
)1−σ
Qsd1
Qsd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)σ(
ξid1
ξid0
)σ−1 RXsd1RXsd0 ,
=
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
P ′sd1
Psd0
)σ∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
(
Pid1
Pid0
)1−σ(
ξid1
ξid0
)σ−1
Qsd1
Qsd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)σ∑
i∈Xs s
X
id0
(
Pid1
Pid0
)1−σ(
ξid1
ξid0
)σ−1 RXsd1RXsd0 ,
=
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
P ′sd1
Psd0
)σ
Qsd1
Qsd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)σ RXsd1
RXsd0
.
Plugging this expression into equation (28), we obtain an implicit equation for the change in the
price index:
ln
[
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1]
= ln
(
sDsd0
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
R′id1
Rid0
+ (1− sDsd0)
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1(P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1)σRXsd1
RXsd0
)
− ln
(
sDsd0
∑
i∈Ds
sDid0
Rid1
Rid0
+ (1− sDsd0)
RXsd1
RXsd0
)
− ln
[
Q′sd1
Qsd0
(
Qsd1
Qsd0
)−1]
. (32)
Summing up, the relevant system of equations is given by equations (25), (26), and (32), which
correspond to equations (19), (20), and (21) in the main text. The unknowns of this system are
the counterfactual to actual relative change in the sectoral aggregate domestic price index,
P ′sd1
Psd0
(
Psd1
Psd0
)−1
;
for every exporting firm in sector s, its counterfactual change in exports
R′ix1
Rix0
;
and, for every active firm (no matter whether it exports or not) in sector s, its counterfactual
change in domestic sales
R′id1
Rid0
.
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Every other element in the system formed by the equations (19), (20), and (21) is either estimated
(as it is the case of the parameters σ and (σ − 1)λ/(1 + λ)) or is directly observed in the data.
Once we have computed the counterfactual changes in exports and domestic sales for every exporter
and every domestic firm in the economy, respectively, we compute their counterfactual exports and
domestic sales in the bust, and add the resulting numbers to compute the aggregate growth rates
in exports and domestic sales shown in Figure 6.
A.4 Decomposition of the Variance of Boom-to-Bust Changes in Total Sales
We can rewrite equation (17) as
Δ lnRix = βΔ lnRi + εix, (33)
with
β = −(σ − 1)λ
1 + λ
and εix ≡ uξix +
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
(uϕi − uωi ), (34)
where, as a reminder, we denote by Δ lnX the residual of a regression of a variable Δ lnX on a set
of sector fixed effects {d}s, location fixed effects {d}, and the observable covariates Δ lnϕ∗i , and
Δ lnω∗i . Using this notation, we can write the probability limit of the OLS and IV estimators of β
as
βols =
cov(Δ lnRix,Δ lnRi)
var(Δ lnRi) , βiv =
cov(Δ lnRix,Δ lnR∗i )
cov(Δ lnRi,Δ lnR∗i )
, (35)
with Δ lnRi = Δ lnR∗i+Δ lnRεi , and where Δ lnR∗i is the part of Δ lnRi that is mean-independent
of the residual of the structural equation, εix, and Δ lnRεi is the part of Δ lnRi correlated with
εix. In practice, given an estimate βˆiv, we recover an estimate of εix for every exporter i as
Δ lnRix− βˆivΔ lnRi and we compute an estimate of Δ lnRεi by running a regression of Δ lnRi on
Δ lnRix − βˆivΔ lnRi.
After simple algebraic manipulations, we can relate βols and βiv as
βols = βiv
var(Δ lnR∗i )
var(Δ lnRi) + βε
(
1− var(Δ lnR
∗
i )
var(Δ lnRi)
)
, (36)
and, thus, we can compute the share of the variance in total sales that is due to factors orthogonal
to the unobserved supply shocks uϕi and u
ω
i and export demand shocks u
ξ
ix as
var(Δ lnR∗i )
var(Δ lnRi) =
βols − βε
βiv − βε . (37)
Given consistent estimates of βols, βiv and βε, we use this expression to compute a consistent
estimate of var(Δ lnR∗i )/var(Δ lnRi). When performing this calculation using our observed data,
we obtain that this ratio of variances is equal to 35%.
We also perform a similar analysis to that described in equations (33) to (37) but without
previously controlling for any fixed effect or any proxy for the firms’ marginal cost shifters. In this
case, our procedure will yield a decomposition of the cross-firm variance in the observed changes
in total sales, var(Δ lnRi), into a component that is due to the impact on Δ lnRi of variables
correlated with the regression residual,
ε˜ix = γsx + γx +
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
δϕΔ ln(ϕ
∗
i )−
(σ − 1)
1 + λ
δωΔ ln(ω
∗
i ) + εix,
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and a component that is due to the impact on Δ ln(Ri) of variables that are orthogonal to ε˜ix.
When performing this variance decomposition, we find that the variables orthogonal to ε˜ix explain
41% of the variance in the observed changes in total sales; i.e. var(Δ lnR∗i )/var(Δ lnRi) = 0.41. It
is important to remark that this alternative variance decomposition is not without concerns, as it
requires assuming that our instrument is valid unconditionally, and not just conditionally on sector
and location fixed effects and our proxies for firms’ factor prices and productivity.
B Data Appendix
B.1 Macroeconomic Data
Data on Spanish unemployment, real GDP, internal demand, private final consumption expenditure
and exports of goods come from the Spanish National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de
Estad´ıstica). Data on merchandise exports and real GDP shares for the countries that belong
to the European Monetary Union and Spain come from AMECO Dataset (i.e., annual macro-
economic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs). Data on unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector for Spain and the European Monetary
Union were obtained from the Bank of Spain (Banco de Espan˜a) and the Eurosystem. We use the
input-output tables produced by the Spanish National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de
Estad´ıstica) for the year 2005 to identify the interlinkages across industries (e.g., the two top
leading input providers or two top leading buying industries of the vehicles manufacturing industry
discarded in the robustness analysis described in Table 4).
B.2 Construction of the Commercial Registry Dataset
As described in Section 3.3, our main source of firm-level data is the Commercial Registry (Registro
Comercial Central), which contains annual financial statements of around 85% of registered firms
in the non-financial economy. We collate data from two separate sources to construct our own
firm-level dataset: (i) the Central de Balances dataset from Banco de Espan˜a and (ii) SABI, from
Informa, a private company. Despite being based on the same original source, these two datasets
are complementary: the first includes the largest number of firms and has the best coverage of
small and medium enterprises, while the second has the most precise coverage of large firms. A
detailed description of how we combine the two sources to construct our firm-level dataset can be
found in Almunia, Lopez-Rodriguez and Moral-Benito (2018).
B.3 Foreign Transactions Dataset
As described in Section 3.3, the Bank of Spain requires all financial institutions and a set of
large companies to report all foreign transactions, including imports, exports and other financial
transactions. Until 2007, there is information for each transaction on the country of destination
(or origin). However, from 2008 onwards, the Bank of Spain relaxed this requirement and allowed
reporting institutions to group multiple transactions into a single reported transaction. In those
cases, the country of destination (or origin) reflected in the data entry correspond to the country
of the largest transaction in that group. Similarly, the product code reported corresponds to the
largest transaction as well. This implies that one cannot analyze changes in exports or imports by
country of destination (or origin) nor by product in a consistent way for periods spanning around
year 2008.
B.3.1 Minimum Reporting Threshold
Between 2001 and 2007, all foreign transactions of more than e12,500 had to be reported to the
Bank of Spain. In order to reduce the compliance costs for reporting institutions, the minimum
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reporting threshold was updated in 2008 to e50,000. From that year onwards, a firm appears
in the dataset if it has at least one transaction larger than e50,000 in that year. In order to
create a homogeneous sample for the period 2002-2013, we apply the post-2008 minimum reporting
threshold to the data from 2002 to 2007, meaning that we only record a positive export flow in
a given year for firms that have at least one transaction exceeding e50,000 in that year. This
adjustment reduces substantially the number of exporting firms that appear in the data, but the
impact on the aggregate amount exported is small.
B.4 Instruments
We construct several instrumental variables using information available at the either zip code,
municipality or province level. The information on the stock of vehicles by both municipality and
province is provided by the Spanish Registry of Motor Vehicles (Direccio´n General de Tra´fico). The
data on the number of foreign tourists and foreign overnight stays at the province level come from
the Spanish National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica). The information on
the population by both municipality and province is provided by the Spanish National Statistical
Office (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica). The data to construct the proxy for the housing supply
elasticity in a given municipality come from the Spanish Cadastre (Direccio´n General del Catastro).
In particular, we use the measure in Basco and Lopez-Rodriguez (2017), which is a municipality-
specific ratio of available “buildable”urban land to urban land with already built structures. The
ratio is calculated in a year sufficiently removed from the housing boom (1996) to avoid feedback
effects of booming prices on the availability of “buildable”urban land during the Spanish housing
bubble in the 2000s. The information on the residential house prices at municipality level used
in Appendix C are obtained from the census of real-estate transactions owned by the Spanish
Ownership Registry (Registro de la Propiedad). We calculate the market value price per square
meter for each residential housing transaction and then aggregate those prices for all transactions
made in a municipality during a natural year to create yearly average prices per square meter. The
price indexes for residential housing are calculated from 2004 to 2012 for municipalities with more
than 1000 inhabitants and more than 30 transactions per year. These indexes are deflated using
the Consumer Price Index provided by the Spanish National Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional
de Estad´ıstica).
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C Appendix Figures
C.1 Share of Exports and GDP Within the European Union
Figure C.1 plots the share of exports to non-EU countries and GDP for Greece, Portugal, Spain
and Germany (see Appendix B.1 for information on the sources of data).
Figure C.1: Share of Exports to non-EU Countries and GDP
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C.2 Spatial Distribution of Economic Activity in Spain
Figure C.2 plots the 2002-2008 annual average number of firms and number of exporting firms for
each of the 47 Spanish peninsular provinces (see Appendix sections B.2 and B.3 for information on
the sources of data).
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Figure C.2: Distribution of Economic Activity in Spain: Variation Across Provinces
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C.3 Province-Level Home Bias in Spanish Manufacturing
Data are for the year 2007 from C-interreg. We are grateful to Carlos Llano for providing them to
us (see Llano et al., 2010, for details on this database).
Figure C.3: Province-Level Home Bias in Spanish Manufacturing
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C.4 First-Stage and Reduced-Form Relationships
The two panels in Figure C.4 provide a graphical representation of the relationship between the
boom-to-bust change in the log of the number of vehicles per capita in a municipality and the boom-
to-bust change in the log of domestic sales (panel a) and exports (panel b) of the firms located in
that municipality. Panel (a) thus represents the first-stage relationship between the endogenous
covariate and the instrument, while panel (b) represents the reduced-form relationship between the
outcome variable of interest and the instrument.
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Figure C.4: First-Stage and Reduced-Form Relationships
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(a) First-Stage Relationship
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(b) Reduced-Form Relationship
Notes: Each dot represents the average change in log real domestic sales (panel a) and in log real exports (panel b) for
a given value of the change in log vehicles per capita in a municipality. Observations are grouped into 30 equal-sized
intervals of the horizontal axis, with the exception of cases where a bin contains five or less observations (which are
grouped together to reduce the influence of outliers). The darkness of the markers is proportional to the number
of observations in each bin. The regression lines depicted are estimated using the same number of observations
(N=8,018) as in the regressions of Table 2, without including any controls or fixed effects.
C.5 Housing Supply Elasticities and Price Growth
The following figure shows that there is a negative correlation between the 1996 ratio of available
‘buildable’ urban land to urban land with already built structures (a proxy for the housing supply
elasticity) and housing price growth between 2004 and 2007.
Figure C.5: Housing Supply Elasticities and Housing Price Growth during 2004-07
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C.6 Counterfactual Export Growth Under Alternative Parametrizations
Figure C.6 is analogous to Figure 6. It differs from it only in that it is computed under an estimate
of −((σ−1)λ)/(1+λ) equal to −1.819 (instead of the baseline estimate of −2.624). This estimate of
−((σ− 1)λ)/(1+λ) is the largest one among all the different estimates arising from the robustness
exercises presented in Online Appendix H.
Given an estimate of −((σ−1)λ)/(1+λ) equal to −1.819, we infer from our variance decompo-
sition that, in the absence of demand shocks, the boom-to-bust drop in aggregate total sales would
have been 10.23%+41%× (−0.01%−10.23%) = 5.61%. Given this drop in domestic sales, we infer
(as in our baseline quantification in Section 7.2) that the contribution of demand to the domestic
slump, 1 − Γ∗, was close to 0.4. At this value of the parameter 1 − Γ, our model predicts that,
in the absence of demand shocks, the growth in exports would have been 6.71%. Given that the
observed growth in exports was 11.99%, our analysis indicates that the vent-for-surplus mechanism
explains (11.99%-6.71%)/11.99% = 44.1% of the total drop in exports.
Figure C.6: Impact of “Vent-for-Surplus” on Aggregate Domestic Sales and Exports
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Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the value of the parameter 1 − Γ. Given a value of
1− Γ, the export and domestic sales growth rates indicated in the vertical axis correspond
to those predicted by equations (18) to (21).
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D Appendix Tables
Table D.1: Additional Robustness Tests
Sample: Excluding Weight by # of Bust as Bust as
multinationals years exporting 2010-2013 2011-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Elasticity -0.194a -0.185a -0.207a -0.241a
(0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
IV Elasticity -1.518a -1.324a -1.648a -1.540a
(0.469) (0.460) (0.497) (0.477)
1st Stage Coefficient 0.336a 0.313a 0.327a 0.327a
(0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.068)
Observations 6,629 8,018 7,357 6,722
F-statistic 26.11 22.54 22.32 22.89
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard
errors clustered by municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include sector and province
fixed effects. Vehicles p.c. denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. First stage coefficient and F-
statistic denote the corresponding statistic for the vehicles p.c. covariate.
Table D.2: Additional Alternative Instruments and Overidentification Tests
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Ln(Vehicles p.c. in 0.349a
in Municipality, 2002 pop.) (0.047)
Δ Ln(Vehicles p.c. in Province) 0.561b
(0.271)
Δ Ln(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) 0.246a
(0.081)
Δ Ln(Construction Employment) × 0.379a
2002 Employment Share in Municipality (0.071)
Δ Ln(Construction Turnover) × 0.147a
2002 Turnover Share in Municipality (0.023)
F-statistic 54.60 19.70 28.31 41.54
ΔLn(Exports)
Δ Ln(Domestic Sales) -1.677a -1.285a -1.349b -1.929a
(0.336) (0.326) (0.587) (0.423)
p-value for Sargan test 0.80 0.46 0.80 0.68
Observations 8,018 8,018 7,928 7,928
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors
clustered by municipality, except for column 2, where they are clustered by province. All specifications
include firm-level log TFP and log wages as additional controls (coefficients not included to save space).
All specifications include province and sector fixed effects, except column 2 which only includes sector
effects.
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Online Appendix
Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic Slump
Miguel Almunia, Pol Antra`s, David Lopez-Rodriguez and Eduardo Morales
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E Biases in the Extensive Margin of Exports
We extend here the analysis in Section 2 to the study of the effect of domestic demand shocks on
the extensive margin of exports.
Given the CES demand function in equation (1) and the assumption that firms are monopolis-
tically competitive in every market, firm i will find it profitable to export at time t only if export
revenue Rixt exceeds a multiple σ of the fixed cost of exporting Fixt. Omitting the subindex t from
the notation for simplicity, we can thus express a dummy taking value one if firm i exports as
dix = {lnRix > σ lnFix}
where {A} denotes an indicator function that takes value one if and only if the statement A is true.
The probability that firm i exports conditional on a vector Xix that includes a set of period-specific
sector fixed effects, location fixed effects, and observed proxies ϕ∗i and ω
∗
i is
Pr(Xix) = [dix|Xix] = [ {lnRix > σ lnFix}|Xix].
Focusing on a linear probability model, we further rewrite the probability of the firm exporting as
Pr(Xix) = [lnRix − σ lnFix|Xix],
and, therefore, we can write the change in the probability of exporting between any two periods as
a function of the changes in the log export revenues and log fixed export costs
ΔPr(ΔXix) = [Δ lnRix − σΔ lnFix|ΔXix}
where, from equation (6),
Δ lnRix = γsx + γx + (σ − 1) δϕΔ ln(ϕ∗i )− (σ − 1) δωΔ ln(ω∗i ) + εix,
with the different terms in this expression defined as in Section 2, and ΔXix is a vector of sector
fixed effects, location fixed effects and first-differences in the observed proxies ϕ∗i and ω
∗
i . We
analogously decompose the log change in fixed costs of exporting as
Δ lnFixt = φsx + φx + φϕΔ ln(ϕ
∗
i ) + φωΔ ln(ω
∗
i ) + u
F
i ,
similarly to how we decomposed the demand shifter, productivity and cost levels in Section 2.
Notice that we are being quite flexible, letting firm-level fixed export costs depend on firm-level
productivity and factor costs, and on both sector and location fixed effects. In particular, Δ lnFixt
depends on the same elements included in the vector ΔXix and the additional term u
F
i .
With these expressions at hand, we can write the change in the probability of exporting, ex-
panded to include log domestic sales as an additional covariate, as
ΔPr(ΔXix) =
[
(γsx − φsx) + (γx − φx) + [(σ − 1) γϕ − σφϕ]Δ ln(ϕ∗i )
− [(σ − 1) δω − σφω]Δ ln(ω∗i ) + βΔ lnRid + εix − σuFi
∣∣ΔXix],
where, as in equation (9), εix = (σ − 1) [uξix + uϕi − uωi ]. Following the same steps as in Section 2,
the following asymptotic properties of βˆOLS can be derived:
plim(βˆOLS) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi − σσ−1uFi , uξid + uϕi − uωi )
var(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi )
.
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The only difference relative to equation (11) is the addition of the term −uFi in the first element
of the covariance in the numerator. It is clear that, as in the intensive margin regressions, this
covariance is likely to be positive, thus generating a positive value of plim(βˆOLS).
The probability limit of the IV estimator of β is given by
plim(βˆIV ) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi − σσ−1uFi ,Zid)
cov(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi ,Zid)
.
This expression will equal zero as long as the instrument Ẑid verifies the following two conditions:
(a) it is correlated with the boom-to-bust change in domestic sales of firm i, after controlling for
(or partialling out) firm and location fixed effects and the boom-to-bust difference in observable
determinants of the firm’s marginal cost; and (b) it is mean independent of the boom-to-bust
changes in unobserved productivity, uϕi , factor costs, u
ω
i , export demand shocks, u
ξ
ix, and export
fixed-cost shocks uFi (this latter being the only additional condition relative to our results for the
intensive margin regressions). As in our discussion in Section 2, an instrument can only (generically)
verify conditions (a) and (b) if its effect on domestic sales works exclusively through the domestic
demand shock uξid.
It is straightforward to extend the above analysis to the case in which total sales and exports
are measured with error and domestic sales are imputed by subtracting exports from total sales.
Following the same steps as in Appendix A.1, we obtain
plim(βˆIV ) =
cov(uξix + u
ϕ
i − uωi − σσ−1uFi + 1σ−1ix,Zid)
cov(uξid + u
ϕ
i − uωi + 1σ−1 (iT −ix) ,Zid)
,
and, thus, the only additional requirement on the instrument is that it is mean independent of the
measurement error in exports ix.
F Estimation of Revenue Productivity
We present a step-by-step description of our baseline estimation approach in Appendix F.1. For
an analogous description of the alternative estimation approach used to compute the estimates in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 9, see Bilir and Morales (2018). We summarize the production function
estimates that both approaches yield in Appendix F.2.
F.1 Baseline Estimation Approach
We describe here the procedure we follow to estimate a proxy for firm- and year-specific performance
or revenue productivity under the assumption that the production function is Leontief in materials.
We describe first the assumptions that we impose on the production function, the demand function,
market structure, and the stochastic process of revenue productivity or performance. Given these
assumptions, we illustrate how we estimate the demand elasticity σ and all parameters of the
revenue function. Finally, we describe how we use these estimates to recover a proxy of the revenue
productivity or performance for every firm and year.
Assumption on production function. We assume a production function that is a Leontief function
of materials and a translog aggregator of labor and capital:
Qit = min{H(Kit, Lit;α),Mit)}ϕit, (F.1a)
H(Kit, Lit;α) = exp(h(kit, lit;α)), (F.1b)
h(kit, lit;α) ≡ αllit + αkkit + αlll2it + αkkk2it + αlklitkit, (F.1c)
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with α = (αl, αk, αll, αkk, αlk). In equation (F.1a), Kit is effective units of capital, Lit is the number
of production workers, Mit is a quantity index of materials use, and ϕit denotes the Hicks-neutral
physical productivity. To simplify the notation in this Appendix section, we use here lower-case
Latin letters to denote the logarithm of the upper-case variable, e.g. lit = ln(Lit). The production
function in equation (F.1) nests that introduced in Appendix A.2, which implicitly assumes that
αll = αkk = αlk = 0. In our estimation, we impose no a priori restriction on the values of the
elements of the parameter vector α and, thus, our estimation framework does not take a stand on
whether marginal production costs are constant (as assumed in Section 2) or increasing (as assumed
in Section 7).
Consistently with the definition of ϕit as physical productivity, we assume that
[ϕit|Jit] = ϕit, (F.2)
where Jit denotes the information set of firm i at the time at which the period-t pricing and input
decisions are taken. Therefore, the firm knows the value of its productivity ϕit when making the
period-t pricing and input decisions.
We assume that both materials and labor are fully flexible inputs, and that capital is dynamic
and determined one period ahead. Consequently, both Mit and Lit are a function of Jit, while Kit
is a function of Jit−1.
Assumptions on demand function. We assume that firms face a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion demand function as described in equation (1), and impose the assumption that the demand
shock ξit is known to firms when determining their input and output decisions; i.e.
[ξit|Jit] = ξit. (F.3)
Assumptions on market structure. As described in Section 2, we assume that firms are monop-
olistically competitive in the output markets and that they take the prices of labor, materials and
capital as given.
Derivation of the revenue function. Given the assumption that materials is a flexible input,
equation (F.1a) implies that optimal materials usage satisfies
Mit = H(Kit, Lit;α).
Therefore, we can rewrite the production function in equation (F.1a) as
Qit = H(Kit, Lit;α)ϕit, (F.4)
where H(Kit, Lit;α) is defined as in equations (F.1b) and (F.1c). Given this expression and the
demand function in equation (1), we can write the revenue function of a firm i at period t as
Rit = PitQit = P
σ−1
σ
st E
1
σ
stξ
σ−1
σ
it Q
σ−1
σ
it = μstH(Kit, Lit;β)ψit, (F.5)
where
κ ≡ (σ − 1)/σ, (F.6a)
β ≡ κα, (F.6b)
ψit ≡ (ξitϕit)κ (F.6c)
μst ≡ P κst(Est)1−κ. (F.6d)
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The parameter κ measures the inverse of the firm’s markup. While the parameter vector α includes
the production function parameters, the vector β includes the revenue function parameters. The
variable ψit captures the revenue productivity of the firm: the residual determinant of a firm’s
revenue after controlling for sector- and year-specific fixed effects and for the effect of capital and
labor on the firm’s revenue. As illustrated in equation (F.6c), revenue productivity equals in our
model the product of the Hicks-neutral productivity ϕit and the demand shifter ξit to the power of
the reciprocal of the firm’s markup. The sector-year fixed effects accounts for the price index and
total expenditure in the corresponding sector-year pair.
Assumptions on stochastic process for revenue productivity. We assume that revenue produc-
tivity follows a first-order autoregressive process, AR(1), with a state- and year-specific shifter:
ψit = γst + ρψit + ηit with [ηit|Jit] = 0. (F.7)
This stochastic process for revenue productivity may arise under different stochastic process for
physical productivity ϕit and the demand shifter ξit; e.g. both variables follow AR(1) process
with identical persistence parameters equal to ρ; or, one of them follows an AR(1) process with
persistence parameter ρ and the other one is independent over time.
Estimation of demand elasticity. In order to estimate the demand elasticity σ, we follow the
approach implemented, among others, in Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) and Antra`s, Fort and
Tintelnot (2017). Given the assumption that all firms are monopolistically competitive in their
output markets, it will be true that
Rit − Cvit =
1
σ
Rit,
where Cvit denotes the total variable costs that firm i incurred at period t to obtain the sales
revenue Rit. This expression indicates that the firm’s total profits (gross of fixed costs) is equal
to the reciprocal of the demand elasticity of substitution σ multiplied by the firm’s total revenues.
Given that the only variable inputs are materials Mit and labor Lit, we can rewrite this relationship
as
Rit − Pmit Mit − ωitLit =
1
σ
Rit,
where Pmit denotes the equilibrium materials’ price faced by firm i at period t, ωit denotes the
equilibrium salary and, thus, Pmit Mit denotes total expenditure in materials’ purchases and ωitLit
denotes total payments to labor. Rearranging terms, we obtain the following equality(σ − 1
σ
)
Rit = P
m
it Mit + ωitLit,
and, allowing for measurement error in sales revenue, Robsit ≡ Rit exp(εit), we obtain
ln
(σ − 1
σ
)
+ robsit − εit = ln(Pmit Mit + ωitLit),
where, as indicated above, lower-case Latin letters denote the logarithm of the corresponding upper
case variable and, thus, robsit ≡ ln(Robsit ). Imposing the assumption that [εit] = 0, we identify σ
through the following moment condition[
ln
(σ − 1
σ
)
+ robsit − ln(Pmit Mit + ωitLit)
]
= 0. (F.8)
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Estimation of labor elasticity parameters. Given equation (F.5), we can write the profit function
of firm i in period t as
Πit = μstH(Kit, Lit;β)ψit − ωitLit − Pmit Mit − P kitIit,
where ωit denotes the wage that firm i faces at period t and, analogously, P
m
it and P
k
it denote the
materials and capital prices. Assuming that labor is a fully flexible input and that firms are both
monopolistically competitive in output markets and take the price of all inputs as given, the first
order condition of the profit function with respect to labor implies that
∂Πit
∂Lit
= (βl + 2βlllit + βlkkit)Rit − ωitLit = 0.
Reordering terms and taking logs on both sides of the equality, we obtain
ln(βl + 2βlllit + βlkkit) = ln(ωitLit)− rit,
and, taking into account that revenues are measured with error, we can further rewrite
ln(βl + 2βlllit + βlkkit) = ln(ωitLit)− robsit + εit.
Assuming that the measurement error in revenue is not only mean zero (as imposed to derive the
moment condition in equation (F.8)) but mean independent of the firm’s labor and capital usage,
[εit|lit, kit] = 0,
we can derive the following conditional moment:
[robsit − ln(ωitLit) + ln(βl + 2βlllit + βlkkit)|lit, kit] = 0.
We derive unconditional moments from this equation and use a method of moments estimator
to estimate (βl, βll, βlk). With the estimates (βˆl, βˆll, βˆlk) in hand, we recover an estimate of the
measurement error εit for each firm i, affiliate j, and period t:
εˆit = r
obs
it − ln(ωitLit) + log(βˆl + 2βˆlllit + βˆlkkit).
Combining the estimates of the parameters entering the elasticity of the firm’s revenues with re-
spect to labor, (βˆl, βˆll, βˆlk), and the estimate of the demand elasticity of substitution, we compute
estimates of the parameters (αl, αll, αlk); i.e.
(αˆl, αˆll, αˆlk) =
σˆ
σˆ − 1(βˆl, βˆll, βˆlk).
Estimation of capital elasticity parameters. Using the estimates (βˆl, βˆll, βˆlk) and εˆit we can
construct a corrected measure of revenues
r̂it ≡ rit − βˆllit − βˆlll2it − βˆlklitkit − εˆit,
and, given the expression for sales revenues in equation (F.5), it holds that
r̂it = βkkit + βkkk
2
it + ψit.
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Given this expression and the stochastic process for the evolution of productivity in equation (F.7),
it will be true that
r̂it = βkkit + βkkk
2
it + μψ(r̂ijt−1 − βkkijt−1 − βkkk2ijt−1) + ζst + ηit, (F.9)
where ζst is an unobserved sector- and time-specific effect that accounts for the revenue shifter μst
and the productivity shifter γst. Given that both Lit and Kit are a function of the information set
Jit, the definition of ηit in equation (F.7) implies that
[ηit|kit, r̂ijt−1, {dst}s,t] = 0,
where {dst}s,t denotes a full set of sector- and time-specific dummy variables. Therefore, we can
derive the following conditional moment equality
[r̂it − βkkit − βkkk2it − ρ(r̂ijt−1 − βkkijt−1 − βkkk2ijt−1)− ζst|kit, r̂ijt−1, {dst}s,t] = 0
We derive unconditional moments from this equation and use a method of moments estimator to
estimate (βk, βkk, ρ). When estimating these parameters, we use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
to control for the full set of sector- and time-specific fixed effects {ζst}s,t. Combining the estimates
of the parameters (βk, βkk), and the estimate of the demand elasticity of substitution σ, we compute
estimates of the parameters (αk, αkk); i.e.
(αˆk, αˆkk) =
σˆ
σˆ − 1(βˆk, βˆkk).
Estimation of productivity. We can also use the estimates of the parameters (βk, βkk) and the
constructed random variable r̂it to build an estimate of the revenue productivity ψit for every firm
and time period
ψ̂it = r̂it − βˆkkit − βˆkkk2it.
F.2 Production Function Estimates
We summarize here the production function and productivity estimates that we obtain both when
we assume a production function that is Leontief in materials (see Appendix F.1 for the correspond-
ing estimation approach) and when we assume instead a production function that is Cobb-Douglas
in materials (see Bilir and Morales, 2018, for the corresponding estimation approach). No matter
which of these two production functions we assume, we estimate the corresponding production
function parameters and demand parameters separately for the boom and bust periods and for
each of the twenty-four 2-digit NACE sectors in which the manufacturing firms in our dataset are
classified. For both the boom and the bust periods, we report here the simple average across all
sectors of the estimated labor and capital elasticities, of the estimated persistence parameters ρ
and of the demand elasticity σ.
Under the assumption that the production function is Leontief in materials, we obtain the
following estimates. In the boom period, the average elasticities of revenue with respect to labor
and capital are 0.23 and 0.19, respectively; the average annual autocorrelation in performance is
0.97; and the average demand elasticity is 3.55. In the bust period, the average elasticities of revenue
with respect to labor and capital are 0.26 and 0.18, respectively; the average annual autocorrelation
in performance is 0.98; and the average demand elasticity is 3.37.
Under the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas in materials, we obtain
the following estimates. In the boom period, the average elasticities of value added with respect to
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labor and capital are 0.76 and 0.19, respectively; the average annual autocorrelation in performance
is 0.78; and the average demand elasticity is 3.19. In the bust period, the average elasticities of
value added with respect to labor and capital are 0.86 and 0.17, respectively; the average annual
autocorrelation in performance is 0.78; and the average demand elasticity is 3.05.
Notice that both estimation approaches yield estimates of the demand elasticity σ that are
a bit low relative to those that, using identification strategies different from ours, are typically
obtained in the international trade literature (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for a review). One possible
explanation for this mismatch between our estimates and those in the international trade literature
is the fact that we cannot observe firms’ expenditure in energy; this may imply that our measure
of the variable production costs underestimates the firms’ total expenditure in variable inputs and,
thus, that our estimates of σ are downward biased. These estimates of σ do not, however, impact
any of the estimates presented in the main draft. More specifically, the only exercise that we
perform in the paper and that relies on the estimated value of σ is the quantification in Section
7.2. However, as indicated in that section, our baseline quantification calibrates the value of σ to
a central value among the estimates computed in the international trade literature; i.e. σ = 5.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure F.1 show, respectively, that the marginal distribution in the boom
and bust periods of the (log) TFP estimates computed following the procedure in Section F.1.
These two marginal distributions are symmetric around zero and close to normally distributed,
reflecting that the distribution of the TFP estimates is close to log-normally distributed. Panels
(c) and (d) show analogous marginal distributions for (log) TFP estimates computed following the
procedure in Bilir and Morales (2018). While the distributions in panels (a) and (b) are similar
to each other, that in panel (d) is clearly different from that in panel (c) in that the fraction of
firms in the lower tail of the distribution is significantly larger. Thus, our value added-based TFP
estimates show that the fraction of firms with relatively lower TFP increased in the bust period
relative to the boom.
Panels (e) and (f) in Figure F.1 show how our two measures of TFP relate to each other. They
show that, on average, there is a positive association between both measures; i.e. firms that have
higher TFP according to our sales-based measure also tend to have higher TFP according to our
value added measure. However, the relationship between both is not perfectly linear but slightly
concave.
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Figure F.1: Productivity Estimates
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Notes: The figures in panels (a) and (b) present the density function of our (log) TFP estimates in boom and bust,
respectively, following the procedure in Section F.1.The figures in panels (c) and (d) present the density function of
our (log) TFP estimates in boom and bust, respectively, following the procedure in Bilir and Morales (2018). The
figure in panel (e) presents a binscatter illustrating the relationship in the boom period between our two estimates
of the firm’s log TFP. The figure in panel (f) is analogous for the case of the bust period. The slope of the regression
lines in panels (e) and (f) are, respectively, 0.62 and 0.6.
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G Exports and Domestic Sales: Year-to-Year Variation
In the main text we focus on empirical specifications that compare export behavior in a bust period
relative to a boom period. In this Appendix section, we study OLS specifications that exploit year-
to-year variation in domestic sales and exports. Before doing so, however, we extend the discussion
in Section 2 to a setup with multiple periods.
G.1 Theoretical Model
We assume here that equations (1) to (3) hold in every year t and, thus, we can write the expression
for log exports by firm i in year t as:
lnRixt = κ+ (σ − 1) [ln ξixt + lnϕit − lnωit]− (σ − 1) (ln τxt − lnPxt) + lnExt, (G.1)
where κ is a constant. In order to transition into an estimating equation, we model the demand,
productivity and cost levels as follows:
ln(ξixt) = ξix + ξxt + ξ˜ix × t+ uξixt,
ln(ϕit) = ϕi + ϕt + ϕ˜i × t+ δϕ ln(ϕ∗it) + uϕit,
ln(ωit) = ωi + ωt + ω˜i × t+ δω ln(ω∗it) + uωit. (G.2)
Note that we are decomposing these terms into (i) a time-invariant firm fixed effect, (ii) a firm-
invariant year fixed effect (which in the regressions will be expanded to include a whole set of
municipality-year and sector-year fixed effects), (iii) a firm-specific linear trend, (iv) an observable
part of these terms for the case of productivity (ϕ∗it) and input bundle costs (ω
∗
it), and (iv) a
residual term on which we impose an assumption analogous to that in footnote 16. Given these
decompositions, we can re-write equation (G.1) as:
lnRixt = κ+ γix + γxt + γ˜ix × t+ (σ − 1) δϕ ln(ϕ∗it)− (σ − 1) δω ln(ω∗it) + εixt, (G.3)
where γix ≡ (σ − 1) [ξix + ϕi − ωi], γxt ≡ (σ − 1) [ξxt + ϕt − ωt] − (σ − 1) (ln τxt − lnPxt) + lnExt,
γ˜ix ≡ (σ − 1) [ξ˜ix + ϕ˜i − ω˜i], and the error term is given by
εixt = (σ − 1) [uξixt + uϕit − uωit]. (G.4)
Following similar steps, we can derive the expression for revenues in the local market:
lnRidt = κ+ γid + γdt + γ˜id × t+ (σ − 1) δϕ ln(ϕ∗it)− (σ − 1) δω ln(ω∗it) + εidt, (G.5)
where γid ≡ (σ − 1) [ξid + ϕi − ωi], γdt ≡ (σ − 1) [ξdt + ϕt − ωt] − (σ − 1) (ln τdt − lnPdt) + lnEdt,
γ˜id ≡ (σ − 1) [ξ˜id + ϕ˜i − ω˜i], and
εidt = (σ − 1) [uξidt + uϕit − uωit]. (G.6)
Consider now using OLS to estimate the parameters of the following regression, which includes
log domestic sales as an additional covariate in equation (G.3):
lnRidt = κ+ γid + γdt + γ˜id × t+ (σ − 1) δϕ ln(ϕ∗it)− (σ − 1) δω ln(ω∗it) + β lnRidt + εidt. (G.7)
From equations (G.6) and (G.7), the probability limit of the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimator
of the coefficient on domestic sales can we written as
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plim(βˆOLS) =
cov(r¨ixt, r¨idt)
var(r¨idt)
=
cov(uξixt + u
ϕ
it − uωit, uξidt + uϕit − uωit)
var(uξidt + u
ϕ
it − uωit)
, (G.8)
where we denote by X¨ the residual of a regression of a variable X on a set of firm fixed effects,
year fixed effects, firm-specific linear time trends, and the proxies lnϕ∗it and lnω
∗
it. Analogously to
the discussion in Section 2, it holds that:
1. As long as productivity and production factor costs are not perfectly observable or captured by
the various fixed effects or the firm-specific trends, there will be a spurious positive correlation
between exports and domestic sales that, in large samples, would lead one to estimate a
positive value of βˆOLS even when marginal costs are constant and, thus, demand-driven
changes in domestic sales do not impact exports.
2. In the presence of a non-zero correlation in the residual demand (partialling out fixed effects)
faced by firms in domestic and foreign markets, βˆOLS will also converge to a non-zero value.
Because this residual variation in demand does not capture market-specific macro shocks
(which are controlled for via municipality-year and sector-year fixed effects), it seems plausible
that uξixt and u
ξ
idt will be positively correlated, leading one again to estimate a positive value
of βˆOLS .
We have focused so far on the intensive margin, i.e., the impact of domestic demand shocks
on the level of exports conditional on exporting. As in Appendix E, an analysis of the extensive
margin of exports delivers very similar insights. More specifically, even if the true elasticity of the
probability of exporting to demand-driven changes in domestic sales were to be 0, one is likely to
estimate a positive elasticity whenever productivity and production factor costs are not perfectly
captured by the various fixed effects, firm-specific trends and observable proxies, or whenever
unobserved residual demand shocks are positively correlated across markets.
G.2 Empirical Results: Intensive Margin
Table G.1 presents OLS estimates from different specifications in which the logarithm of exports of
a firm in a given year is regressed on the logarithm of its domestic sales in the corresponding year
and different sets of controls. When no firm-specific controls are included in the regression, the
discussion in Appendix section G.1 implies that we expect to observe a positive relationship between
a firm’s domestic sales in a given year and its volume of exports. This positive relationship is indeed
observed in column 1 of Table G.1, in which we estimate an elasticity of export flows with respect to
domestic sales of 0.645. The only controls in that regression are sector-year and municipality-year
fixed effects.
In the remaining columns of Table G.1, we control for various sources of marginal cost and
export demand heterogeneity across firms, with the aim of attenuating the biases identified in
equation (G.8). In column 2, we introduce firm fixed effects, thus controlling for differences in firm
characteristics that are constant over time and that may impact their productivity, factor prices and
export demand shifters. The resulting estimated elasticity is very close to zero, −0.074, consistent
with the predictions of the constant marginal cost model. Columns 3 and 4 additionally control for
observed time-varying determinants of firms’ marginal costs. Specifically, we control in column 3
for a measure of the firm’s productivity (estimated, as in the main text, following the procedure in
Gandhi et al., 2016), and we additionally control in column 4 for a measure of the firm’s average
wages (reported by the firm in its financial statement). Consistent with the results in the boom to
bust regressions in the main text, controlling for these supply shocks reduces the OLS estimate of
the coefficient on domestic sales, which goes down to −0.263. This indicates that, once we control
for the firm’s supply shocks, domestic sales and exports are negatively correlated. Columns 5 and
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6 aim to additionally control for unobserved determinants of firms’ marginal costs that are time
varying. To do so, we additionally include firm-specific time trends as controls. The resulting
estimates are again lower and indicate that a 10% decrease in a firm’s domestic sales, keeping its
productivity and average wages constant, implies a 3.19% increase in its aggregate export flows.
The last two columns in Table G.1 re-estimate the regression models in columns 2 and 6 using
a specification in first-differences (instead of in levels). The differences between the coefficients on
the domestic sales covariate in columns 2 and 7 (higher in the specification in levels than in that in
first differences) reflect the fact that, while some of the missing covariates in these two specifications
(i.e., firms’ time-varying productivity and average wages) are strongly serially correlated and share
common underlying trends with the corresponding firm’s domestic sales, their year-to-year variation
is less correlated with the yearly changes in domestic sales. Consistently with this interpretation,
once we control for these serially correlated determinants of firms’ marginal costs, the coefficient
on domestic sales in the levels specification (column 6) becomes very similar to that in the first-
differences specification (column 8). Given that the specifications in columns 6 and 8 yield very
similar estimates, but the latter is computationally easier to estimate, we focus on the specification
in first differences in the remaining tables presented in this Appendix.
As discussed in Section 5.1, one might be concerned that because total sales is a key input in
the computation of our firm-level measure of TFP, our empirical results are just unveiling a me-
chanical negative correlation between exports and domestic sales once one holds total sale revenue
constant. The correlation beween log TFP and log total sales in our data is however far from
Table G.1: Intensive Margin
Dependent Variable: Ln(Exports) ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Domestic Sales) 0.645a -0.074a -0.231a -0.263a -0.228a -0.319a
(0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Ln(TFP) 1.031a 1.344a 1.061a
(0.042) (0.048) (0.063)
Ln(Average Wages) -0.627a -0.463a
(0.041) (0.047)
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.228a -0.320a
(0.012) (0.013)
ΔLn(TFP) 0.917a
(0.047)
ΔLn(Average Wages) -0.408a
(0.033)
Observations 54,575 54,276 54,276 54,276 54,276 54,276 54,575 54,276
R-squared 0.474 0.898 0.904 0.906 0.951 0.953 0.237 0.368
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-specific trends No No No No Yes Yes No No
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by firm in parentheses. Exports, domestic sales and average wages are in constant 2011 euros. For any variable
X, ΔLn(X) is the difference in Ln(X) between two consecutive years.
perfect. Specifically, the correlation between log changes in TFP and log total sales is 0.31. Notice
also that columns 5 and 7 in Table G.1 unveil a negative correlation between log changes in exports
and log changes in domestic sales even when not controlling for log changes in TFP.
In Figure G.2, we complement the analysis in Table G.1 by estimating sector-specific elastic-
ities of exports with respect to domestic sales (see Table G.2 in Appendix D for the associated
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regression tables).1 The main conclusion is that the negative elasticity between domestic sales and
exports documented in Table G.1 is pervasive across nearly all manufacturing sectors, the only
exception being the “Pharmaceutical Products” sector, whose 95% confidence interval is such that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that, after controlling for firm-specific fixed effects and time
trends and observed measures of productivity and labor costs, changes in domestic sales have no
impact on exports. For all remaining sectors, the estimated elasticity of interest oscillates between
−0.156 (manufacture of leather and related products) and −0.565 (manufacture of paper and paper
products).
1We exclude the “tobacco”, the “petroleum refining”, and the “other transport” sectors (two-digit industry codes
12, 19 and 30, respectively) due to the extremely low number of firms in those sectors.
Table G.2: Intensive Margin - Heterogeneity by Sector
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
Sector Food Beverages Textiles Clothing Leather Wood Paper
NACE code 10 11 13 14 15 16 17
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.244a -0.325a -0.264a -0.447a -0.156a -0.234a -0.565a
(0.041) (0.082) (0.048) (0.105) (0.029) (0.056) (0.117)
ΔLn(TFP) 0.750a 0.243 0.578a 0.827a 0.449a 0.512a 1.093a
(0.101) (0.201) (0.143) (0.217) (0.138) (0.196) (0.192)
ΔLn(Average Wages) -0.350a 0.091 -0.464a -0.179 -0.225a -0.003 -0.585a
(0.065) (0.146) (0.102) (0.168) (0.078) (0.125) (0.211)
Observations 7,578 1,729 2,489 968 2,620 1,725 1,434
R-squared 0.302 0.361 0.379 0.382 0.348 0.402 0.341
Sector Printing Chemicals Pharma. Plastic Non- Basic Fabric.
metals Metals Metals
NACE code 18 20 21 22 23 24 25
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.531a -0.357a -0.378c -0.456a -0.426a -0.241a -0.409a
(0.097) (0.048) (0.214) (0.065) (0.054) (0.066) (0.040)
ΔLn(TFP) 1.082a 1.125a 0.973a 1.238a 0.910a 0.870a 1.424a
(0.320) (0.203) (0.305) (0.129) (0.162) (0.140) (0.129)
ΔLn(Average Wages) -0.620a -0.490a -0.448c -0.514a -0.271b -0.338b -0.493a
(0.224) (0.112) (0.250) (0.104) (0.118) (0.133) (0.090)
Observations 1,258 4,854 1,166 3,979 3,190 2,179 7,226
R-squared 0.343 0.286 0.305 0.345 0.388 0.325 0.283
Sector Computers Electron. Machine Vehicles Furniture Repair Other
NACE code 26 27 28 29 31 32 33
ΔLn(Domestic Sales) -0.321a -0.414a -0.280a -0.367a -0.452a -0.351a -0.369a
(0.082) (0.058) (0.024) (0.048) (0.092) (0.075) (0.062)
ΔLn(TFP) 1.023a 0.911a 1.114a 0.992a 1.227a 1.262a 1.562a
(0.249) (0.259) (0.146) (0.202) (0.231) (0.309) (0.399)
ΔLn(Average Wages) -0.360b -0.430c -0.604a -0.545a -0.546a -0.557a -0.653b
(0.146) (0.225) (0.120) (0.153) (0.159) (0.181) (0.300)
Observations 1,490 2,307 7,502 2,833 1,407 1,287 1,211
R-squared 0.321 0.336 0.241 0.309 0.354 0.349 0.388
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. All specifications
contain firm fixed effects and province-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
Exports, domestic sales and average wages are in constant 2011 euros. For any variable X, ΔLn(X) is the
difference in Ln(X) between two consecutive years.
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Figure G.2: Intensive Margin - Heterogeneity by Sector
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Note: The dotted vertical line reflects the average estimate reported in column 8 of Table G.1. The black dots reflect
the sector-specific point estimates; the red lines reflect the 95% confidence interval for each of the sectoral estimates.
G.3 Extensive Margin
Local demand shocks may not only generate an intensive margin change in the export volume of
those firms participating in export markets but may also lead firms to either start exporting or to
stop participating in foreign markets, thus affecting the extensive margin of trade. We next explore
the effect of demand-driven changes in domestic sales on the probability that a firm exports. To
do so, we estimate three different types of binary choice models: static conditional logit models
(columns 1 to 5 in Table G.3), a static linear probability models (column 6 in Table G.3), and a
dynamic linear probability model (column 7 in Table G.3).
The results regarding the impact of domestic sales on the extensive margin of exports are
similar to those described above for its impact on the intensive margin of exports. When we do
not include any control for firm-specific marginal costs, we observe a positive correlation between a
firm’s domestic sales and its probability of exporting. As columns 2 and 3 in Table G.3 illustrate,
controlling either for firm fixed effects only or for firm and sector-year fixed effects reduces the
coefficient on domestic sales in absolute value but preserves its positive sign. Nevertheless, when we
include controls for observable time-varying determinants of a firm’s marginal cost, the elasticity of
export participation with respect to domestic sales becomes negative. The most general conditional
logit specification that we run accounts for firm fixed effects, sector-year fixed effects, and firm-
year specific measures of productivity and average wages (column 5); the resulting elasticity of the
export probability with respect to domestic sales is −0.312.2
2The parameters in columns 2 to 5 have been estimated following the procedure in Chamberlain (1980). This
estimation procedure maximizes a conditional likelihood function that does not depend on the firm fixed effects and,
consequently, does not yield estimates of these unobserved effects. However, given the nonlinear nature of the model,
the elasticity of the export probability with respect to domestic sales does depend on these unobserved effects. For the
exclusive purposes of computing the elasticities reported in the last row of Table G.3, we have set all these unobserved
effects equal to zero.
Contrary to the specifications discussed in Appendix G.2, those discussed in columns 1 to 5
of Table G.3 do not account for firm-specific time trends. Accounting for both firm fixed effects
and firm-specific time trends in a conditional logit model would be problematic for two reasons.
First, it would be computationally very challenging. Second, it would give rise to an incidental
parameters problem (Chamberlain, 1980), resulting in inconsistent estimates of the elasticity of
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Table G.3: Extensive Margin
Model: Conditional Logit Linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln(Domestic Sales) 1.184a 0.141a 0.255a -0.164a -0.312a -0.030a -0.038a
(0.008) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.001) (0.001)
Log TFP 1.530a 2.134a 0.065a 0.064a
(0.050) (0.063) (0.003) (0.003)
Log Average Wages -0.982a -0.033a -0.033a
(0.050) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged Participation 0.161a
(0.006)
Observations 747,519 129,712 129,712 129,712 129,712 747,519 495,151
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-specific trends No No No No No Yes No
Elasticities 1.035 0.016 0.013 -0.150 -0.312 -0.234 -0.284
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Columns 1 to 5
present Maximum Likelihood estimators of the corresponding conditional logit model. Column 2 to 5 present
estimates computed following the procedure in Chamberlain (1980). Column 6 presents OLS estimates of
the corresponding linear probability model. Column 7 presents estimates computed following the procedure
in Arellano and Bond (1991). The number of observations in columns 1, 6 and 7 correspond to the number
of firm-years that we observe in our sample when taking into account all firms. The number of observations
in columns 2 to 5 correspond to the number of firm-years that we observe in our sample when taking into
account only those firms that change their export status at least once during the sample period. Standard
errors in parentheses. Exports, domestic sales and average wages are in constant 2011 euros. For any variable
X, ΔLn(X) is the difference in Ln(X) between two consecutive years.
export participation with respect to domestic sales.3 Consequently, to test the robustness of our
estimates to accounting for firm-specific time trends, we resort to the linear probability model
specification. The estimates in column 6 of Table G.3 predict an elasticity of export participation
with respect to domestic sales of −0.234, very similar to that predicted by the conditional logit
model in column 5.
As shown in Das et al. (2007) and Morales at al. (2018), the export decision of firms is
dynamic, depending both on their prior export status as well as on their expectations of future
potential profits that a firm may earn by entering export markets. While correctly accounting
for firms’ expectations of future export profits is beyond the scope of this paper (see Dickstein
and Morales, 2018), accounting for the prior export status of each firm only requires additionally
controlling for a dummy that captures each firm’s one-year lagged export participation (see Roberts
3Charbonneau (2017) introduces a new estimator that allows to consistently estimate binary logit models in the
presence of an individual-specific fixed effect and a choice-specific fixed effect. This estimator does not apply to our
context, in which both sets of unobserved effects are firm-specific.
and Tybout, 1997). We introduce this control in column 7 of Table G.3: the resulting estimate of
the export participation elasticity with respect to domestic sales is −0.284, very similar to those
obtained in columns 5 and 6.
In sum, our OLS estimates in Tables G.1, G.2, and G.3 demonstrate the existence of a strong,
within-firm negative relationship between demand-driven changes in domestic sales and changes in
the intensive and extensive margin of exports. As discussed in Section 2, however, it is reasonable
to expect that these OLS estimates underestimate the extent to which demand-driven reductions
in domestic demand generate expansions in export markets.
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H Regression Results with Total Sales instead of Domestic Sales
We present in this Appendix section specifications analogous to those in tables 1 to 10, with the
only difference that the boom to bust log change in total sales is included as right-hand-side variable
instead of the corresponding log change in exports.
Table H.1: Intensive Margin: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Ln(Total Sales) 0.891a 0.778a 0.764a 0.778a 0.785a 0.801a
(0.029) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.041)
Δ Ln(TFP) 0.302a 0.334a 0.409a 0.397a 0.382a
(0.046) (0.053) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057)
Δ Ln(Avg. Wages) -0.069 -0.107b -0.095b -0.051
(0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.050)
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 7,507
R-squared 0.164 0.170 0.170 0.210 0.223 0.327
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE No No No No Yes No
Municipality FE No No No No No Yes
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are reported in parenthesis. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the difference in
Ln(X) between its average in the 2009-2013 period and its average in the 2002-2008 period. The estimation
sample includes all firms selling in at least one year in the period 2002-2008 and in the period 2009-2013.
Table H.2: Intensive Margin: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales) ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Ln(Total Sales) -4.767b -2.220a -2.326a -2.624a
(2.355) (0.770) (0.763) (0.916)
Δ Ln(Vehicles p.c. 0.154a 0.271a 0.262a 0.221a
in Municipality) (0.052) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046)
Δ Ln(TFP) 0.827a 0.983a 0.985a 2.771a 3.361a 3.741a
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.642) (0.762) (0.900)
Δ Ln(Avg. Wages) -0.519a -0.432a -1.675a -1.567a
(0.026) (0.031) (0.419) (0.408)
F-statistic 8.84 33.07 34.34 23.42
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018
Sector FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Province FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality appear in parenthesis. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the log difference between the average of X in
2009-2013 and its average in 2002-2008. Vehicles p.c. denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. Columns 1-4
contain first-stage estimates; columns 5-8 contain second-stage estimates. F-statistic denotes the corresponding
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Ln(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) equals zero.
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Table H.3: Extensive Margin: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: Export Dummy Proportion of Years
1st Stage OLS 2nd Stage OLS 2nd Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Total Sales) 0.072a -0.133 0.054a -0.088
(0.003) (0.225) (0.002) (0.119)
Ln(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) 0.072a
(0.022)
Ln(TFP) 1.091a 0.002 0.226 0.014a 0.168
(0.015) (0.005) (0.247) (0.003) (0.130)
Ln(Average Wages) -0.415a -0.010b -0.096 -0.017a -0.076
(0.011) (0.004) (0.094) (0.002) (0.050)
F-statistic 10.20
Observations 125,808 125,808 125,808 125,808 125,808
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.183 0.183 0.113 0.113
Ext-Margin Elasticity 0.395 -0.729 0.474 -0.777
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by zip code appear in parenthesis. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the log difference between the average of X in 2009-2013
and its average in 2002-2008. Vehicles p.c denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. All specifications include firm
fixed effects, sector-period fixed effects, and province-period fixed effects.
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Table H.4: Intensive Margin: Robustness to Excluding Zip Codes Linked to Auto Industry
Panel A: Exclude zipcodes w/ Panel B: Exclude zipcodes with
high auto employment share at least one sizeable auto maker
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales)ΔLn(Exp) ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales) ΔLn(Exp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Δ Ln(Total Sales) 0.787a -4.317a 0.771a -6.016b
(0.039) (1.409) (0.047) (2.393)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.181a 0.147a
in Municipality) (0.056) (0.047)
Δ Ln(TFP) 0.381a 0.975a 5.341a 0.407a 0.952a 6.845a
(0.057) (0.025) (1.369) (0.071) (0.032) (2.275)
Δ Ln(Avg. Wages) -0.062 -0.419a -2.198a -0.124* -0.400a -2.831a
(0.049) (0.030) (0.608) (0.067) (0.037) (0.992)
F-statistic 14.16 6.98
Observations 7,178 7,178 7,178 4,613 4,613 4,613
Panel C: Exclude zipcodes ‘ne- Panel D: Exclude sectors w/
ighboring’ zipcodes in Panel A I-O links to automakers
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales)ΔLn(Exp) ΔLn(Exp)ΔLn(DSales) ΔLn(Exp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage OLS 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Δ Ln(Total Sales) 0.810a -4.851b 0.825a -6.095b
(0.040) (1.888) (0.046) (2.469)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.170a 0.136a
in Municipality) (0.056) (0.047)
ΔLn(TFP) 0.351a 0.972a 5.836a 0.330a 0.975a 7.058a
(0.060) (0.025) (1.817) (0.067) (0.029) (2.388)
Δ Ln(Avg. Wages) -0.071 -0.393a -2.292a -0.118b -0.399a -2.874a
(0.060) (0.025) (1.817) (0.067) (0.029) (2.388)
F-statistic 9.38 8.33
Observations 6,137 6,137 6,137 6,080 6,080 6,080
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered by
municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include sector and province fixed effects. For any X, ΔLn(X) is the
log difference between the average of X in 2009-2013 and its average in 2002-2008. ‘Exp’ denotes exports, and ‘DSales’
denotes domestic sales. ‘Vehicles p.c.’ denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. ‘F-statistic’ denotes the corresponding
statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) covariate is equal to zero.
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Table H.5: Heterogeneous Effects: First Stage
Sample:
Number of workers is in the interval: Low Home High Home
(0, 25] [26,∞) [51,∞) [101,∞) [201,∞) Bias Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st-Stage Coefficient 0.293a 0.197a 0.164b 0.074 0.043 0.260a 0.161a
(0.086) (0.049) (0.066) (0.084) (0.117) (0.071) (0.058)
F-Statistic 11.73 15.93 6.24 0.78 0.14 13.33 7.67
Observations 2,641 5,376 3,190 1,672 790 4,768 3,249
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include sector and province fixed effects. Vehicles p.c.
denotes the stock of vehicles per capita. First-stage coefficient and F-statistic refer to the elasticity of the change
in the firm’s log domestic sales with respect to the change in log vehicles p.c. in the municipality of location of
the firm. For columns 1 to 5, the firm’s number of workers is measured as the average across all years the firm
appears in the sample.
Table H.6: Heterogeneous Effects: Second Stage
Sample Low High Low High
Labor Labor Materials Materials
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd-Stage Coefficient -3.325c -1.753c -3.169c -1.836c
(1.872) (1.013) (1.792) (1.040)
1st-Stage F -Stat. 8.80 11.44 6.96 15.26
Observations 3,914 3,914 4,100 3,711
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10%
significance. Standard errors clustered by municipality appear in parenthesis.
All specifications include sector and province fixed effects. Vehicles p.c. denotes
the stock of vehicles per capita. First-stage coefficient and F-statistic refer to
the elasticity of the change in the firm’s log domestic sales with respect to
the change in log vehicles p.c. in the municipality of location of the firm. In
columns 1 to 4, we classify firms on the basis of firm-specific labor and materials
elasticities computed following the procedure in Bilir and Morales (2018). This
table eliminates the specifications in the first two columns of Table 6, as these
are not meaningful when ΔLn(Total Sales) is the right-hand-side variable.
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Table H.7: Alternative Instruments and Overidentification Tests
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.617a
in Province) (0.129)
ΔLn(Distance-Population 0.136a 0.083a
Weighted Vehicles p.c. (0.027) (0.021)
in Other Zip Codes)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. 0.204a
in Municipality) (0.060)
Ln(Urban Land Supply 0.018b
Ratio in 1996) (0.009)
ΔLn(Construction Wage Bill) × 0.286a
2002 Wage Bill Share (0.050)
in Municipality
ΔLn(Foreign Tourists) × 0.176a
2002 Foreign Tourists p.c. (0.064)
in Province
F-statistic 22.80 25.48 16.97 4.13 32.82 7.55
ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔLn(Total Sales) -1.972b -3.120b -2.100b -2.605 -1.819b -1.869a
(0.785) (1.537) (0.877) (2.047) (0.745) (0.537)
P-value for Sargan Test 0.76 0.23 0.23 0.60 0.56 0.92
Observations 8,018 7,949 7,949 6,940 7,928 8,018
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by province except for columns 4 and 5, in which they are clustered by municipality. All specifications include firm-
level log TFP and log average wages as additional controls (coefficients not included to save space). Additionally,
all specifications also include sector fixed effects, and columns 4 and 5 also include province fixed effects.
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Table H.8: Confounding Factors
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ΔLn(Total Sales) -2.624a -2.347a -2.724a -2.783a -2.143b -2.096b -2.721a
(0.916) (0.888) (1.019) (1.021) (0.881) (0.854) (1.017)
ΔShare of Temp. Workers -0.501b
(firm level) (0.199)
ΔShare of Temp. Workers -0.240
(municipality level) (0.259)
ΔManufacturing Empl. p.c. -0.422a
(municipality level) (0.113)
ΔLn(Financial Costs) -0.057a
(firm level) (0.020)
Ln(Financial Costs in Boom) -0.007
(firm level) (0.020)
Ln(Financial Costs in Boom) -0.006
(municipality level) (0.063)
F-Statistic 23.42 21.35 21.00 20.49 20.18 21.23 21.43
Observations 8,018 7,649 7,746 7,748 6,886 6,952 7,743
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard errors clustered
by municipality are included in parenthesis. All specifications include firm-level log TFP and log wages as
additional controls (coefficients not included to save space). All specifications also include sector and province
fixed effects.
Table H.9: Alternative TFP Measures
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Exports)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
ΔLn(Total Sales) 0.785a -2.624a 0.880a -1.969b
(0.037) (0.916) (0.028) (0.931)
ΔLn(Avg. Wages) -0.095b -1.567a -0.293a -1.097a
(0.047) (0.408) (0.063) (0.288)
ΔLn(TFP Sales) 0.397a 3.741a
(0.053) (0.900)
ΔLn(TFP Value Added) 0.504a 1.584a
(0.056) (0.365)
F-Statistic 23.42 17.85
Observations 8,018 8,018 8,018 8,018
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance.
Standard errors clustered by municipality. All specifications include firm-level log average
wages and sector and province fixed effects as additional controls.
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Table H.10: Placebo Tests of First Stage
Dependent Variable: ΔLn(Domestic Sales)
Sample: Boom firms Bust firms
Within Boom vs. Within Boom vs.
Boom Bust Bust Bust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔLn(Vehicles p.c. in Municipality) -0.087c 0.113b 0.056 0.128a
(0.053) (0.048) (0.063) (0.048)
Observations 5,344 5,344 5,245 5,245
F-statistic 2.73 5.40 0.79 7.12
Note: a denotes 1% significance, b denotes 5% significance, c denotes 10% significance. Standard
errors clustered by municipality appear in parenthesis. All specifications include firm-level log TFP
and log average wages as additional controls. These coefficients are not included to save space. All
specifications also include sector and province fixed effects. The sample use to compute the estimates
in columns 1 and 2 includes all firms active in at least one year in the subperiod 2002-05 and in at
least one year in the subperiod 2006-08. The sample use to compute the estimates in columns 3 and
4 includes all firms active in at least one year in the subperiod 2009-11 and in at least one year in
the subperiod 2012-13.
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